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Summary 
The Horn of Africa (HoA) remains a major source of mixed migration, with people moving 
to neighbouring countries, the Gulf, Southern Africa and Europe. There are multiple 
drivers of migration, from issues around political persecution, armed conflict and natural 
disasters, to problems accessing livelihoods in contexts of extreme poverty and economic 
exclusion, which is often the result of deliberate government policy. While multiple 
drivers may affect the same individual and blur the distinction between refugee and 
migrant, the price people on the move are paying has become remarkably high in recent 
years, and many have lost their lives. 
In 2014, in recognition of the challenges of “mixed migration”, 37 states in Europe and 
Africa, along with the European Union (EU) and African Union (AU), formed a policy 
platform (the “Khartoum Process”), with a particular focus on tackling smuggling and 
trafficking. The platform’s aim is to strengthen cooperation and create a sustainable 
regional dialogue on mobility and migration. This paper, based on 67 qualitative 
interviews conducted in Ethiopia, Sudan and Europe with Eritreans on the move, directly 
engages with this framework. It analyses the approach taken by states in the region, in 
cooperation with regional and international actors, to more effectively combat 
trafficking and smuggling in light of the experiences and decision-making processes of 
the individuals interviewed.  
The Khartoum Process created a platform for international engagement on an issue that 
is both urgent and, by its very nature, of international concern. There are various projects 
and initiatives being carried out under this framework, many of which are still at 
relatively early stages of implementation. The intention of this report is not to examine 
these initiatives, but to focus on the overall approach driving the Khartoum Process 
framework and suggest why some of its key aspects are problematic. Based on this 
analysis, it argues for a different approach to migration management in the region, and 
between the region and Europe.  
Key to this alternative approach, is a shift in focus onto the political context in which 
migration takes place, rather than the criminality that it attracts. This shift acknowledges 
the lack of choices that people are confronted with throughout their journeys, a lack of 
choice that is driven by structural factors that cannot be resolved without a deeply 
political engagement that begins to dismantle them.  
Most Eritreans who leave their country are forced to rely on smugglers to ensure that they 
successfully evade border controls. They flee the prospect of decades of military service 
under a state that disrespects their rights as citizens on multiple levels. Their irregular 
entry into neighbouring countries, however, and their often-precarious status, then 
makes individual migrants and refugees vulnerable to trafficking, particularly from 





refugee camps.1 Smuggling and trafficking in human beings has developed into a 
transnational business operated by criminal networks, whose members often come from 
disadvantaged backgrounds. 
Within this context, those interviewed made a clear distinction between smuggling and 
trafficking.2 Most saw at least some smuggling as a form of protection and assistance; 
although they also recognised that abuses occurred, particularly where people fell into 
the hands of traffickers. In contrast to the “benign” end of smuggling, which holds a 
degree of legitimacy within communities, trafficking was described as organised and 
violent, and held no legitimacy. Yet due to the prevalence of criminality on the routes, 
people are knowingly putting themselves at risk of kidnapping for ransom, rape and 
torture. They are also putting huge financial and psychological pressure on their families 
to find money they often do not have. The negative ripple effect on Eritrean families 
across the globe is hard to exaggerate.  
The line between smugglers as “humanitarians” or service 
providers helping people to flee a repressive state, and the 
exploitation and abuse associated with trafficking, was seen as 
painfully thin 
As a result, people have to make terrible trade-offs with regards to their safety. The line 
between smugglers as “humanitarians” or service providers helping people to flee a 
repressive state, and the exploitation and abuse associated with trafficking, is seen as 
painfully thin. People are acutely aware of this and attempt to mitigate the risk by using 
smugglers or routes that are perceived to be more reliable and safe. The descriptions of 
their journeys pointed to a pattern in which journeys become increasingly dangerous, 
often as the link between the migrants and the original smuggler gets weaker. 
The responses of state institutions in the region to these realities vary significantly, not 
only between countries but also within each of the states in the region. While some 
institutions and officials offer protection and assistance to people on the move and 
respect human rights, other state institutions are predatory and carry different degrees 
of responsibility for the abuses that refugees and migrants face. In other words, while 
states and their capacity to operate are undeniably part of the solution, it should also be 
recognised that they are often directly or indirectly part of the cause.  
Therefore, an approach that focuses exclusively on the criminality that migration attracts 
is likely to be palliative, because it deals with symptoms rather than causes. Instead, the 
environment from which people are prised out of their homes, and in which traffickers 
 
1. The term “irregular” denotes movement that does not follow, or fall within, legally recognised modes of entering states. 
2. Smuggling refers to illegal action designed to assist migrants to cross international borders for the purposes of the migrants 
themselves, whereas trafficking refers moving persons across borders to serve a purpose of the trafficker. 
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can operate with impunity, needs to be addressed simultaneously. While criminal 
investigations, arrests and prosecutions should take place, the processes and means to do 
this need to support this greater goal. It demands a policy approach that addresses drivers 
of insecurity – including inequality, injustice and marginalisation – rather than 
exacerbates them. Unless the broader context of corruption and the mismanagement of 
power is addressed there will always be other criminal actors waiting to step in. 
decisions to cross borders irregularly and take extreme risks are 
often taken when alternative options are perceived to be equally 
bad, or potentially worse. 
The findings show that most Eritreans who decide to migrate have a clear knowledge of 
the fact that they are taking a huge risk, but are usually only vaguely aware of the specifics 
of that risk, and how to avoid it. Family links play an important role in the context of 
decision-making: most people get their information from family and friends, rather than 
from state institutions, NGOs or the media. Whether inside Eritrea or outside, ultimately 
people look to those who they most trust for information. 
Thus, decisions to cross borders irregularly and take extreme risks are often taken when 
alternative options are perceived to be equally bad, or potentially worse. What policy 
makers view as an ill-informed decision is often calculated risk-taking. Many of those who 
migrate irregularly do so not because they are unaware of legal migration procedures or 
because these are “non-transparent and over-bureaucratic,”3 but because it is clear to 
them that the legal routes are so limited for people in their situation that they cannot rely 
on them as viable solutions. 
Finally, the report places a particular focus on the relationship between policy approaches 
to tackling smuggling and trafficking and refugee policy, given that a large percentage of 
Eritreans appear to be refugees. Many of those who move from the region to Europe do so 
as a result of failures in refugee policies and practices in first countries of asylum, policies 
that have left millions of people living for years and sometimes decades in a protracted 
situation of exile with no prospect of any real solution. These failures hinge primarily 
around the emphasis on encampment for those in exile and failures around access to 
work and durable solutions. Combined, these policy failures have created a semi-
permanent state of emergency, jeopardising quality of life and bringing the 
humanitarian system to breaking point.4  
In this context, creating access to livelihoods helps. In fact, it is vital. But it has to be 
accompanied by a wider political conversation and action in which spaces for legal and 
political belonging are negotiated and expanded. People want access to livelihoods, but 
 
3. The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) COM (2011) 743, 18 Nov 2011. 
4. For an extensive critique of the impact of these policy failures, see Lucy Hovil, Refugees, Conflict and the Search for 
Belonging. Palgrave 2016, pp. 155 – 191. 





they also need to have a degree of security that places their economic security within a 
broader context of political security. A top-down, instrumentalist approach to “migration 
management” is likely to be ineffective in a context in which individuals are desperate, 
and are determined to escape oppressive political systems, conflict and dismal living 
conditions. 
The report, therefore, argues for a new approach and engagement on mixed migration in 
the HoA. This new approach is one that closely involves people in the region, and takes 
their experiences, concerns and rights seriously. It involves active participation in policy-
making and implementation, and a conceptual shift that recognises migration, 
particularly forced migration, as a logical response to a deep-seated governance crisis in 
the region. Addressing this crisis also requires a rights-based approach that focuses on 
both adequate human rights protection in individual countries, and the protection of the 
rights of refugees and migrants across the region. In this regard, partnerships and 
international cooperation need to move beyond the technocratic and managerial project 
approach taken to date.  
Ultimately, this approach entails acknowledging how the actors involved, both states in 
the HoA and in Europe, have created, sustained and contributed to the very conditions 
that their current initiatives are meant to tackle. Such a self-reflexive, critical and 
contextual approach is feasible. It would be more demanding for the actors involved as it 
would require fundamental reforms of governance in the HoA and of the EU’s and 
European states’ approach to migration and refugees from the region. However, without 
such changes and without adequate mechanisms to monitor respect for rights and 
ensure protection, it is almost certain that any initiatives taken will not succeed in 
creating the conditions needed to make them effective and sustainable. 
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Background 
Migration to Europe in context 
Increasing numbers of people have been travelling to Europe over the past five years, and 
migration has become a central political concern in many European countries as a result. 
What is euphemistically referred to as the refugee or migrant “crisis” in Europe is, in fact, 
a complex situation in which both non-refugee migrants and refugees – and those who 
do not fit comfortably into either category – are seeking access to sanctuary and 
livelihoods in Europe.  
However, the irregular movement of people into Europe can only be understood and 
responded to appropriately when placed in a broader historical, political and 
geographical context. The colonial period saw high levels of migration from Europe, in 
particular to areas that were being colonised outside of Europe, followed by migrations 
within Europe after the Second World War. This has been replaced in recent decades by 
migration from the “global South” to Europe, driven, in part, by the legacies of that 
colonisation.5  
In the HoA, the vast majority of those who are on the move remain in the region. And for 
those who do decide to move out of the region, the route to Europe is only one of several 
routes that can be used. The majority of those who leave the Horn go east, through Yemen 
to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, while others travel south, through Kenya, to South 
Africa.6 
Remove these realities from the equation around discussions on migration to Europe and 
the narrative is prone to being driven primarily by political expediency and populist 
sentiments – as well as by genuine underlying factors, albeit leading to responses that are 
often misconceived. To use the word “crisis” with any legitimacy, therefore, demands a 
shift in focus away from Europe (where, realistically, the term does not apply, other than 
a crisis in terms of policy-making),7 to places where conflict and the mismanagement of 
resources have left millions of people without access to human security and where there 
really is a crisis. The arrival in Europe of a few hundred thousand people across the 
Mediterranean, therefore, is only a small part of a much bigger story. 
 
5. For a broader discussion on the linkages between colonialism and displacement, see Lucy Hovil and Zachary Lomo, “Forced 
Displacement and the Crisis of Citizenship in Africa’s Great Lakes Region: Rethinking Refugee Protection and Durable 
Solutions.” Refuge Vol. 31 (2), Dec 2015. 
6. During 2016, for instance, some 40,773 asylum seekers from the HoA entered Italy by sea, while more than 117,000 asylum 
seekers from the HoA travelled east to Yemen, primarily Ethiopians and Somalis. See Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, 
“Regional Mixed Migration Annual Trend Analysis 2016.” 
www.regionalmms.org/trends/RMMS%20Mixed%20Migration%20Annual%20Trends%20Analysis%202016.pdf Accessed 5 
October 2017. The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat also estimates that up to 16,850 people travel southwards from the 
HoA every year towards South Africa. See Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, “Smuggled South.” March 2017. 
http://regionalmms.org/images/briefing/Smuggled_South.pdf Accessed 5 October 2017.  
7. See Geoff Gilbert, “Why Europe Does Not Have a Refugee Crisis.” International Journal of Refugee Law 27(1) 2015, 531-535. 





This report focuses on one part of that story, on Eritreans who have made, or are in the 
process of making, the journey from Eritrea to Europe. It places their journeys and the 
reasons that compelled them to leave within this broader political, historical and 
geographical context – thereby shifting the centre of gravity for analysis from Europe to 
the HoA region of which Eritrea is a part.  
The arrival in Europe of a few hundred thousand people across 
the Mediterranean, therefore, is only a small part of a much 
bigger story 
The Horn of Africa and Eritrea  
Geographically, the HoA region includes Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea, as well as 
the semi-autonomous region of Somaliland, while the “Greater Horn” region also includes 
Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and South Sudan. The Horn countries control access to the Gulf of 
Aden, which connects the Suez Canal with the Indian Ocean and the oil-producing 
countries of the Arabian Peninsula. The region also benefits from a 25,000-mile long 
coastline adjacent to important maritime routes, while the River Nile and its tributaries 
run through large parts of the region.  
Despite, and arguably because of, its potential wealth and strategic location at a crossroad 
of trade routes, the region has suffered from prolonged conflict and displacement, and 
has long been of interest to major regional and global powers. During the Cold War, the 
United States (US) and the Soviet Union, as well as Middle Eastern countries, were all 
involved in the region’s conflicts,8 but the world’s interest waned after the end of the Cold 
War. This changed as a result of the global “War on Terror”, and in particular, after the 1998 
al-Qaida terrorist attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The rise of al-Shabaab 
in Somalia and an increase in Somali piracy activity, led to growing Western attention.9 
Regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran also use the HoA as a battleground for their struggle 
for influence in the broader region, with Eritrea, which switched allegiance from Iran to 
Saudi Arabia in 2015, at the centre of this power struggle.  
Within the region, Ethiopia has generally been a strong international ally.10 Djibouti has 
also attracted international attention despite its small size, hosting Camp Lemonnier, the 
largest US permanent military base in Africa, which houses over 4,000 people. The French 
 
8. Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, “Iran in the Horn of Africa: Outflanking U.S. Allies.” Middle East Policy Council, Volume XIX, Summer, 
Number 2. www.mepc.org/iran-horn-africa-outflanking-us-allies Accessed 20 July 2017. 
9. Peter Kagwanja, “Counter-Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: New Security Frontiers, Old Strategies,” African Security Review 
15:3, 2006, p. 72-86. 
10. For more background, see Fikrejesus Amahazion, “Examining International Sanctions: The Case of Eritrea.” Foreign Policy 
Journal, 5 October 2016. www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2016/10/05/examining-international-sanctions-the-case-of-eritrea/ 
Accessed 2 October 2017. 
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have also had a base in Djibouti for decades, and are now joined by the Chinese and 
Japanese military.11 
Politically, Eritrea remains isolated. The tense relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
has tended to leave Ethiopia strongly within the international fold and Eritrea somewhat 
out in the diplomatic cold. For instance, in 2007 Eritrea suspended its membership of the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); and since 2009, United Nations (UN) 
sanctions have been in place on Eritrea as punishment for its “financial and logistical 
support to armed groups engaged in undermining peace and reconciliation in Somalia.”12 
Although Eritrea re-joined IGAD in 2011 (although is not, as yet, allowed to participate in 
meetings), and economic interest in Eritrea has continued,13 Eritrea’s standing as an 
outsider has remained firmly in place.  
While the increase in irregular migration to Europe has not brought about an immediate 
change in Eritrea’s international standing, it has certainly altered the rules of 
engagement with the Eritrean state: with significant numbers of Eritreans arriving in 
Europe, Eritrea has once more become of strategic interest to Europe. Europe’s response, 
through the various mechanisms outlined below, has been to reinstate aid and offer 
substantial assistance in an effort to stem the flow. The logic behind this assistance is that 
the primary drivers from Eritrea are economic, and that sufficient development 
assistance will stop its citizens from leaving.14 This logic ties in with, and is fuelled by, the 
broader popular discourse in Europe, in which migration is largely portrayed and 
perceived as economically motivated.15 
Migration from Eritrea into Sudan and Ethiopia  
Eritrea is a small country. Out of a population of about 5.2 million, an estimated 5,000 
Eritreans leave the country every month. Of those, more than 20,000 Eritreans crossed the 
sea from North Africa to Italy in 2016,16 and more than 5,000 made the journey in the first 
six months of 2017.17  
Eritrea is also one of the poorest countries in the world, something many attribute to its 
highly repressive state institutions and their strongly securitised policies, including the 
 
11. Tomi Oladipo, “Why are there so many military bases in Djibouti?” 16 June 2016. www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33115502 
Accessed 15 July 2017. 
12. UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1907 (2009) [on arms embargo against Eritrea and on expansion of the 
mandate of the Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 751 (1992)], 23 December 2009, S/RES/1907 
(2009). www.refworld.org/docid/4b66c06cd.html Accessed 12 October 2017.  
13. A number of mining companies, including from Canada, the UK and South Africa have signed agreements with the Eritrean 
government.  
14. “EU considering working with Sudan and Eritrea to stem migration”, the Guardian, 6 June 2016. 
www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/06/eu-sudan-eritrea-migration Accessed 15 July 2017. 
15. See e.g. Umut Korkut et al. (eds), The Discourses and Politics of Migration in Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 
16. UNHCR, “Desperate Journeys – January to June 2017,” 21 August 2017, p. 15. 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/58838 Accessed 24 August 2017.  
17. UNHCR, “Italy: Sea arrivals dashboard, January – July 2017.” 09 August 2017. https://reliefweb.int/report/italy/italy-sea-
arrivals-dashboard-january-july-2017 Accessed 5 October 2017.  





country’s official national conscription policy for adults between the ages of 18 and 50.18 
Eritrea’s human rights record is claimed to be one of the worst in the world, and legal 
movement into and out of the country is tightly controlled and restricted.  
Mass displacement from Eritrea is not new. The mid-1960s witnessed the first significant 
displacement of Eritreans into Sudan, as tens of thousands fled the violence between the 
Ethiopian government and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) during the Eritrean war of 
independence (1961-1991).19 By the early 1980s, as the war intensified, the number of 
Eritreans seeking asylum in Sudan was more than 400,000, with the famine of 1984-5 
leading to additional mass displacement within the region.20 At this time, it was relatively 
rare for Eritrean refugees to flee into Ethiopia.21  
Eritrea’s human rights record is claimed to be one of the worst in 
the world, and legal movement into and out of the country is 
tightly controlled and restricted 
In the decade following the end of the war in 1991, overall migration from Eritrea 
somewhat declined, but in recent years the country has re-emerged as one of the major 
refugee producing countries in the world.  
During the final stages of the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000), 
Eritrean refugees began to cross the border into Ethiopia in relatively small numbers, but 
their numbers have increased dramatically since. While in 2005 Ethiopia hosted some 
10,700 Eritrean refugees, by 2011 they numbered almost 50,000.22 As of May 2017, Ethiopia 
hosted some 161,398 Eritrean refugees, making them the country’s third biggest refugee 
group after South Sudanese (378,285) and Somalis (249,903).23 Most refugees in Ethiopia 
live in camps, but a recent shift in the country’s national refugee policy should allow for 
greater freedom of movement and the opportunity for some refugees to work.24  
 
18. “Eritrea ranks 179 out of 188 in the UN’s Human Development Index”, UN Human Development Report 2016, Human 
Development for Everyone, UNDP. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf Accessed 17 
July 2017. 
19. David R. Smock, “Eritrean Refugees in the Sudan,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 20:3, 1982, p. 451-465. 
20. Africa Watch, Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia. New York, 1991.  
21. Gaim Kibreab, “The national service/Warsai-Yikealo Development Campaign and forced migration in post-independence 
Eritrea.” Journal of Eastern African Studies, 7:4, 2013, p. 636-7. (Kibreab 2013) 
22. Ibid. 
23. UNHCR, Ethiopia: Refugees and Asylum-seekers as of 31 May 2017, 7 June 2017. www.refworld.org/docid/593fe2664.html 
Accessed 24 August 2017. 
24. Samuel Hall Consulting, “Living out of Camp: Alternatives to Camp-based Assistance for Eritrean Refugees in Ethiopia,” 
Report commissioned by the Norwegian Refugee Council, 2014. http://samuelhall.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Living-Out-
of-Camp-Alternative-to-Camp-based-Assistance-in-Ethiopia.pdf Accessed 3 October 2017; Samuel Hall Consulting, “Thinking 
forward about livelihoods for refugees in Ethiopia: learning from NRC’s programming.” Report commissioned by the 
Norwegian Refugee Council, 2017. http://samuelhall.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Thinking-forward-about-Livelihoods-for-
Refugees-in-Ethiopia-FINAL-REPORT.pdf Accessed 3 October 2017.  
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Sudan has also received large number of Eritrean refugees since the early 2000s. At the end 
of 2016, UNHCR estimated that the country hosted 103,200 refugees from Eritrea.25 Sudan 
has ratified both the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol and the 1969 
African Union Convention, but its refugee policies and asylum laws have restricted 
freedom of movement. Throughout the years some refugees have been able to defy these 
policies and settle in urban areas.26 Some Eritrean refugees have also been granted 
Sudanese citizenship “informally” and have integrated into the Sudanese society and 
economy. Most, however, have been restricted to designated camps.27 
Those who leave the camp risk arbitrary arrest by Sudanese 
security forces and, in many cases, refoulement 
Those who leave the camp risk arbitrary arrest by Sudanese security forces and, in many 
cases, refoulement. The Sudanese government has been repeatedly blamed for deporting 
Eritreans back to their country in recent years.28 There have been increasing concerns of 
growing crackdowns on refugees and migrants from Ethiopia and Eritrea, with stories of 
individuals being arrested, lashed with leather whips and, in many cases, deported.29 
Recently, the government of Sudan has tasked the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a 
paramilitary force primarily used to lead counter-insurgency operations in Darfur, with 
some elements of border control.30  
For many Eritrean (and other) refugees, however, both Ethiopia and Sudan are – or, are 
meant to be – transit points, rather than final destinations. Tens of thousands of 
Eritreans have moved to Israel since the late 2000s, although the land route through the 
 
25. UNHCR, “Global Focus: Sudan.” http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2535 Accessed 24 August 2017. 
26. See further Munzoul A. M. Assal, “Refugees From and To Sudan.” Paper prepared for the Migration and Refugee Movements 
in the Middle East and North Africa, The Forced Migration & Refugee Studies Program, The American University in Cairo, 
Egypt, 23-25 October 2007. 
27. Kibreab, 2013, p. 640. 
28. For example, “UNHCR ‘deeply concerned’ over asylum-seekers deported from Sudan to Eritrea”, Radio Dabanga, 6 September 
2017. www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/unhcr-deeply-concerned-over-asylum-seekers-deported-from-sudan-to-
eritrea Accessed 12 October 2017; HRW, “Sudan: Hundreds Deported to Likely Abuse Show More Services”, 30 May 2016, 
www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/30/sudan-hundreds-deported-likely-abuse Accessed 24 August 2017.  
29. Arthur Neslen, “EU urged to end cooperation with Sudan after refugees whipped and deported”, The Guardian, 23 February 
2017. www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/feb/27/eu-urged-to-end-cooperation-with-sudan-after-refugees-
whipped-and-deported?CMP=share_btn_tw Accessed 28 February 2017.  
30. The RSF (Arabic: Quwat al-Da’m al-Seri’), was established in mid-2013 by the Sudanese government. Its first recruits were 
Darfur Arab Border Guards, and it was deployed in South Kordofan before being redeployed to Darfur in early 2014. The 
force initially fell under the control of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS). In early 2017, the Sudanese 
parliament turned the RSF into an “autonomous” force but under the control of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). The RSF has 
been accused of war crimes and grave human rights violations. See HRW, “’Men With No Mercy’: Rapid Support Forces 
Attacks against Civilians in Darfur, Sudan.” 9 September 2015. 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/sudan0915_4up.pdf Accessed 23 October 2017; Small Arms Survey, “Remote-
control breakdown: Sudanese paramilitary forces and pro-government militias.” April 2017. 
www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-27-Sudanese-paramilitary-forces.pdf Accessed 23 
October 2017; Suliman Baldo, “Border Control from Hell: How the EU’s Migration Partnership Legitimizes Sudan’s ‘militia 
state’.” Enough Project, April 2017. https://enoughproject.org/files/BorderControl_April2017_Enough_Finals.pdf Accessed 12 
October 2017.  





Sinai has largely become impassable in recent years – partly as a result of the high levels 
of trafficking and violence associated with this route, but mainly as a result of Israel’s 
tightening of its land border (and increased restrictions on asylum seekers).31  
Increasingly, Eritreans have also sought to move to Europe through Sudan and Libya or 
Egypt, joining African asylum seekers and migrants of other nationalities that make their 
journey, through what is known as the “Central Mediterranean Route”, into Europe.  
How many of those Eritreans that leave for Ethiopia and Sudan plan to travel onwards, 
and how many of them actually do, is difficult to estimate. Research indicates, however, 
that the numbers are significant. Kibraeb argued in 2013 that upon leaving Eritrea, “nearly 
all post-independence asylum seekers” who leave for Sudan do not plan to stay there.32 
Research in 2014 by Samuel Hall Consulting suggested that over 80 percent of the 
Eritreans living in refugee camps in Ethiopia surveyed stated that they had plans to move 
on.33 This was also borne out by a study by Amnesty International which showed that just 
under two-thirds of Eritreans in Ethiopia actually moved on from Ethiopia in 2015, many 
with the aim of reaching Europe.34 
Precarious journeys  
Most Eritreans who leave the country do so illegally, as very few of those under the age of 
50 are able to obtain the necessary exit permit or visa.35 Once an individual has left the 
country illegally, it then becomes dangerous for him or her to return in a context in which 
“departing unofficially or fleeing national service recruitment is perceived as an act of 
defection, treachery and political dissent that could result in the grave censure of 
migrants themselves and of relatives by Eritrean authorities.”36 
Given that leaving the country legally is usually impossible, many of those who leave 
Eritrea have to do so with the assistance of a smuggler, and “migrant smuggling is 
therefore embedded into the core of survival in the country in its present context.”37 The 
use of smugglers then continues throughout the journey. Europol estimates that 90 
 
31. See International Refugee Rights Initiative, “’I was left with nothing’: ‘Voluntary’ departures of asylum seekers from Israel to 
Rwanda and Uganda,” September 2015. www.refugee-rights.org/Publications/Papers/2015/IWasLeftWithNothing.pdf 
Accessed 5 October 2017; Human Rights Watch, “‘I Wanted to Lie Down and Die’: Trafficking and Torture of Eritreans in 
Sudan and Egypt.” February 2014. www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/11/i-wanted-lie-down-and-die/trafficking-and-torture-
eritreans-sudan-and-egypt Accessed 24 February 2017. (HRW 2014). 
32. Kibreab 2013, p. 640. 
33. Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014. 
34. Amnesty International, “Tackling the Global Refugee Crisis: From Shirking to Sharing Responsibility.” London, 2016. 
www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol40/4905/2016/en/ Accessed 12 October 2017 
35. Human Rights Council, “Detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in Eritrea.” A/HRC/32/CRP.1, 8 June 
2016, p. 15, 22. www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIEritrea/A_HRC_32_CRP.1_read-only.pdf. 
36. Christopher Horwood with Kate Hooper, “Protection on the move: Eritrean refugee flows through the greater Horn of Africa.” 
Migration Policy Institute, September 2016, p.9. www.migrationpolicy.org/research/protection-move-eritrean-refugee-flows-
through-greater-horn-africa Accessed 21 February 2017. 
37. Tuesday Reitano, Peter Tinti, Mark Shaw and Lucia Bird, “Integrated Responses to Human Smuggling from the Horn of Africa 
to Europe.” The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, May 2017. http://globalinitiative.net/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/global-initiative-human-smuggling-from-the-horn-of-africa-may-2017-web.pdf Accessed 5 October 
2017. (Reitano et al 2017) 
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percent of the 1.1 million migrants and refugees that entered Europe irregularly in 2015 
were assisted by smugglers,38 while a study by the European Migration Network put the 
estimate at 100 percent.39 
many of those who leave Eritrea have to do so  
with the assistance of a smuggler 
While smuggling is illegal, by definition those who opt to use smugglers choose to do so. 
In that respect, and as this report demonstrates, smugglers are often seen effectively as 
travel agents or service providers – or possibly even as humanitarians – inasmuch as 
they help people to flee the country and then continue their journey. As Reitano observed, 
“smugglers are predominantly recruited as protectors of migrants from predatory 
states.”40 However, and as evidenced below, smugglers often turn on their clients during 
the journey, or kidnap and abuse them to extort money from their relatives in exchange 
for onward travel. 
Smuggling and trafficking, it should be stressed, are two different crimes that are often 
conflated. The three main differences between smuggling and trafficking revolve around 
the issues of consent, exploitation and transnationality.41 First, although smuggling 
often takes place in dangerous and degrading conditions, it involves the consent of 
migrants – albeit consent that might be derived from a lack of better alternatives. In 
contrast, those who are victims of trafficking have not consented to be trafficked. Second, 
in theory, smuggling should end with the migrants' arrival at their destination, while 
trafficking generally involves ongoing exploitation, either during the migrants’ journey 
or at their destination. Finally, smuggling, by definition, is always transnational, while 
trafficking can occur within a state as well as between states. 
Despite the distinction between the legal definitions of smuggling and trafficking, the 
difference between the two offences can become rather vague in cases of smuggling with 
 
38. Europol, “Europol launches the European migrant smuggling centre”, Press Release, 22 February 2016. 
www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol-launches-european-migrant-smuggling-centre Accessed 23 February 2017. 
39. European Migration Network, “A Study on Smuggling of Migrants: characteristics, responses and cooperation with third 
countries”, European Commission, DG Migration and Home Affairs, 2015. https://emnbelgium.be/publication/study-
smuggling-migrants-characteristics-responses-and-cooperation-third-countries-emn Accessed 23 February 2017. 
40. Tuesday Reitano, “The Khartoum Process: A sustainable response to human smuggling and trafficking?” Institute for Security 
Studies and The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, November 2016. 
https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief93.pdf. See further Peter Tinti and Tuesday Reitano, Migrant, 
Refugee, Smuggler, Saviour, Hurst, 2016. 
41. UNODC, “Trafficking in Persons and Migrant Smuggling” (www.unodc.org/lpo-brazil/en/trafico-de-pessoas/index.html). For the 
definition of smuggling under international law, see Art. 3 in UN General Assembly, “Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,” 15 
November 2000. (UN Smuggling Protocol, 2000) For the definition of trafficking under international law, see Art. 3 in UN 
General Assembly, “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,” 15 November 2000. (UN Trafficking 
Protocol, 2000). 





aggravated circumstances. These are cases of smuggling in which the lives of migrants are 
being endangered, or cases of smuggling that involve inhuman or degrading treatment.42 
Smuggling and trafficking, both within and from the HoA, has become highly 
sophisticated, lucrative and responsive to changes in the policy context. For example, 
since late 2000, Italy and Libya have signed a number of bilateral agreements to enhance 
their cooperation in efforts to prevent irregular immigration from Africa.43 These have 
led Italy to send refugees crossing the Mediterranean back to Libya and research has 
linked the start of these push-backs to the start of the Sinai trafficking.44  
Between 2009 and 2013, an estimated 25,000 – 30,000 people were victims of trafficking in 
the Sinai, with many of those either taken as they were moving through Sudan or 
kidnapped from or inside refugee camps near the town of Kassala in eastern Sudan who 
were then transferred to Egyptian traffickers.45 Stories emerged of collusion between 
Sudanese and Egyptian security forces with the traffickers at checkpoints and police 
stations,46 and of involvement of the Eritrean government’s military Border Surveillance 
Unit.47 A conservative estimate of the value of ransoms paid during that time as being 
USD 600 million.48  
When the Israeli government effectively sealed its border with Sinai around 2011-12, 
smuggling and trafficking routes from Ethiopia and Sudan reopened up to the west, and 
Eritreans increasingly took the treacherous journey across the Sahara Desert to Libya.49  
The Rashaida, a nomadic group living in Eritrea and eastern Sudan, have been implicated 
in trafficking and smuggling in that area. They allegedly kidnap, for ransom, Eritreans 
fleeing towards Shagarab refugee camp in Sudan, with relative impunity and seemingly a 
lack of fear of prosecution from law enforcement either side of the border. As SIHA states: 
“The kidnapping of refugees is becoming a viable livelihood activity for the Rashaida.”50 
However, one interviewee for this research stated that traditionally the Rashaida have 
shown great sympathy with people fleeing, sharing their limited resources with those on 
the move, so care must be taken when understanding their role.51 
Further along the route, recent instability in Libya has presented both an opportunity and 
a threat for those seeking to reach Europe – an opportunity inasmuch as it creates an 
 
42. UN Smuggling Protocol 2000, Art. 6. 
43. For background on these agreements, see Mariagiulia Giuffré, “State Responsibility Beyond Borders: What Legal Basis for 
Italy’s Push-backs to Libya?” International Journal of Refugee Law 24:4 (2012), p. 692–734.  
44. Mirjam van Reisen, Meron Estefanos and Conny Rijken “Human Trafficking in the Sinai: Refugees between Life and Death,” 
Tilburg University and Europe External Policy Advisors, 2012, p. 13-14; and Mirjam van Reisen, Meron Estefanos and Conny 
Rijken, “The Human Trafficking Cycle: Sinai and Beyond.” Wolf Legal Publishers, 2014.  
45. HRW, 2014 
46. Ibid. 
47. van Reisen et al, 2014. 
48. van Reisen et al, 2014. 
49. HRW, 2014. 
50. SIHA, “A report to the Commission of Inquiry on human rights in Eritrea.” May 2015. 
www.sihanet.org/sites/default/files/resource-download/Eritrea%20Situation%20Report%20(SIHA,2015).pdf Accessed 1 
March 2017. 
51. Interview with Eritrean man, Europe, July 2017.  
THE NEED FOR AN EMPIRICALLY GROUNDED EU POLICY ON MIXED MIGRATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
 
 
BACKGROUND  15 
 
unregulated space for people to move “irregularly”, but a threat because that same lack of 
regulation allows for their exploitation with impunity. Based on anonymous surveys 
taking place at arrival locations in southern Italy, the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) found that nearly three-quarters (71 percent) of migrants taking the 
Central Mediterranean routes had experienced some form of exploitation and practice 
that could amount to human trafficking.52 Libya’s militia-run detention centres have 
been described as “no more than forced labour camps and makeshift prisons,”53 in which 
there is a pattern of arbitrary detention for long periods, in inhumane conditions.54  
Should migrants survive these risks, they will then embark on the route from Libya and 
into Europe, across the Central Mediterranean, which is currently considered to be the 
most dangerous and deadliest migration route in the world. According to the IOM, more 
than 14,500 people have died attempting to cross the Mediterranean from Libya since 
2014.55  
The role of state actors 
One of the major challenges in tackling trafficking is the alleged collaboration between 
traffickers and security, military and police officials.56 As the Global Initiative against 
Transnational Organized Crime notes, “to operate as a smuggler facilitating movement 
across the region’s most controversial borders requires the capacity for high-level 
corruption or the direct involvement of state officials.”57  
The involvement of Sudanese, Eritrean and Egyptian officials – both street level 
bureaucrats but also some officials of senior rank – in smuggling and trafficking has 
been documented. SIHA, for instance, argues that “the human trafficking and smugglers 
networks operating in Sudan, Eritrea and Egypt are led by top government and military 
officials in all three countries. These networks expand from these countries reaching to 
Europe and Asia. These smuggling and trafficking networks are strong, profitable, well 
established and protected.”58 Certainly, their current financial success is enormous: it has 
been estimated by EUROPOL that in 2015, smugglers bringing migrants to Europe may 
have netted as much as EUR 6 billion.59  
 
52. IOM, “Abuse, Exploitation and Trafficking: IOM reveals data on the scale of the danger and risks that migrants face on the 
Mediterranean routes to Europe.” 18 October 2016. http://unitedkingdom.iom.int/abuse-exploitation-and-trafficking-iom-
reveals-data-scale-danger-and-risks-migrants-face Accessed 22 February 2017. 
53. UNICEF, “A deadly journey for children: The Central Mediterranean migration route.” UNICEF-Child Alert, 28 February 2017. 
www.unicef.de/blob/135970/6178f12582223da6980ee1974a772c14/a-deadl-journey-for-children---unicef-report-data.pdf 
Accessed 28 February 2017. 
54. “Detained Youth: The fate of young migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in Libya today.” MHub, July 2015. 
www.mixedmigrationhub.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/MHUB_Naik_Libya_Detention_Sep2015.pdf Accessed 22 February 
2017. 
55. IOM, “The Central Mediterranean Route: Migrant Fatalities, January – July 2017.” https://gmdac.iom.int/the-central-
mediterranean-route-migrant-fatalities-january-july-2017 Accessed 5 October 2017.  
56. See, for instance, van Reisen et al, 2014. 
57. Reitano et al, 2017, p. vii.  
58. SIHA, 2015. 
59. Thomas Escritt, “People-smuggling gangs net 6 billion euros in migrant traffic to Europe: Europol”. Reuters, 22 February 2016 
issue. http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-migrants-europol-idUKKCN0VV1LR Accessed 21 February 2017. 





Tackling trafficking in this context is excruciatingly difficult. It poses a major challenge 
for how to end impunity for trafficking, and the very practice itself, in a context in which 
it is deeply enmeshed with modes of governance and business in the region.  
The policy context 
Policy makers in the sub-region (IGAD), continent (AU), and beyond (EU, UN) agree that the 
current situation of mixed migration in and from the region constitutes a problem and a 
challenge that requires action. However, there is less consensus on what constitutes the 
core problem. Is it large-scale migration, and, if so, its impact (security, stability, 
sustainability etc.) on host countries or the risk of onward migration to Europe? Is it the 
violation of the human rights of migrants and refugees, or the situation of governance 
and human rights protection in the region more broadly, or a combination thereof? 
Equally, there is no clear consensus on the policy objectives pursued in responding to the 
problem; is it primarily to manage (i.e. control) migration; to protect migrants and 
refugees; or to bring about lasting change that would fundamentally alter the political 
and economic causes of current forms of mixed migration? These questions matter, as 
diverging perceptions and objectives shape policy-making and implementation.  
In light of this, this report explores the relationship between EU migration control 
measures and the realities of migration on the ground, seeking to examine some of the 
key assumptions on which these policies are based. Before presenting these assumptions, 
however, it is important to understand the evolution of the recent engagement of the EU 
with countries in the HoA over migration management.  
The EU’s engagement 
The influence of European policies on border control measures in Africa has been evident 
for decades. Nevertheless, the visibility and scale of people arriving in Europe on boats in 
2014, led to an additional series of responses by European states, and a number of bilateral 
and multilateral initiatives have been established with the ultimate intention of 
reducing the numbers of those trying to reach Europe’s borders. 
The influence of European policies on border control measures in 
Africa has been evident for decades 
In November 2014, Ministers of the 28 EU member states and Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, 
South Sudan, Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, Egypt and Tunisia, EU and AU Commissioners in 
charge of migration and development and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy and observers from Switzerland and Norway, came together in Rome 
to launch the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, generally known as the 
THE NEED FOR AN EMPIRICALLY GROUNDED EU POLICY ON MIXED MIGRATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
 
 
BACKGROUND  17 
 
Khartoum Process.60 The Khartoum Process is an “inter-continental consultation 
framework”,61 which is meant to tackle “the challenges posed by the mixed migratory 
flows of irregular migrants, refugees and asylum seekers between countries of origin, 
transit and destination between the Horn of Africa and Europe.”62 
The Khartoum Process came a month after an initiative by the AU – the AU-Horn of Africa 
Initiative on Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants (AU-HoAI) – was established 
in Khartoum as a forum to strengthen the cooperation on migration management in the 
HoA.63 Although there is significant overlap – and, to some extent, the initiatives created 
parallel frameworks – the AU-HoAI has a wider remit, responding to the upsurge in 
irregular migration within and from the HoA to Southern Africa, the Middle East, Europe 
and farther afield. 
The Valetta Summit on migration in 2015 built on the Khartoum Process and led to the 
adoption of the Joint Valletta Action Plan (JVAP) and the launch of a EUR 1.8 billion EU’s 
Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa. The JVAP was designed “to address the root causes 
of irregular migration and forced displacement; enhance cooperation on legal migration 
and mobility; reinforce the protection of migrants and asylum seekers; prevent and fight 
irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings; and work more 
closely to improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration.”64  
The EUTF is meant to support the implementation of the JVAP, while the Khartoum 
Process framework was mandated with monitoring its implementation in the context of 
the HoA.65 A total of EUR 878.8 million from the EUTF was set aside specifically for the 
HoA, to address root causes, improve conditions for refugees, IDPs and host communities 
and to strengthen migration management until 2020.66 The EUTF’s work is underpinned 
by a Research and Evidence Facility, designed to create an evidence base for activities.67  
With the support of the EUTF and under the framework and monitoring of the Khartoum 
Process, several regional and national initiatives have been established.68 EUR 46 million, 
 
60. “Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of the Khartoum Process (EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative).” Rome, 28 
November 2014. http://italia2014.eu/media/3785/declaration-of-the-ministerial-conference-of-the-khartoum-process.pdf 
Accessed 12 October 2017. (Rome Declaration). Uganda joined the Khartoum Process in July 2017. See Khartoum Process 
Newsletter, “Uganda becomes an official member of the Khartoum Process.” 5 October 2017. 
www.khartoumprocess.net/news-and-events/newsletter/issue-1/59-uganda-becomes-an-official-member-of-the-khartoum-
process Accessed 12 October 2017.  
61. Khartoum Process, “About”. www.khartoumprocess.net/about/the-khartoum-process Accessed 12 October 2017.  
62. Rome Declaration, p. 2. 
63. African Union, “Khartoum Declaration on AU-Horn of Africa Initiative on Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants.” 16 
October 2014. https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32899-file-6._au-hoai-declaration_2014_finaladopted.pdf Accessed 23 
October 2017.  
64. European Commission, “Valetta Summit on Migration.” 11 – 12 November 2015. 
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/ Accessed 4 March 2017. 
65. The Rabat Process platform is mandated with monitoring and reporting the implementation of the JVAP in the West African 
context. See Khartoum Process, “What is the Joint Valletta Action Plan?” www.khartoumprocess.net/jvap-monitoring/about 
Accessed 12 October 2017.  
66. See, Khartoum Process, “The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF).” www.khartoumprocess.net/operations/36-the-eu-
emergency-trust-fund-for-africa-eutf Accessed 12 October 2017. 
67. See www.soas.ac.uk/ref-hornresearch/. The facility is led by Dr. Laura Hammond, SOAS, University of London.  
68. These are listed on the Khartoum Process website: www.khartoumprocess.net Accessed 12 October 2017.  





for instance, has been allocated for the “Better Migration Management” (BMM) project, 
which is being run by a consortium led by the German Development Agency (GIZ) in 
partnership with organisations including IOM and the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC).69 
Other initiatives include “Regional Development and Protection Programmes” (RDPP) set 
to “address the long-term development and protection needs” of Somali and Eritrean 
refugees in Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Somalia and Sudan (EUR 117 million in total), and 
“Stemming Irregular Migration in Northern and Central Ethiopia” (SINCE), a project that 
is meant to improve “the living conditions of potential migrants and returnees” (EUR 20 
million).70 
In December 2016, the EU also signed two contracts with IGAD, both financed through the 
EUTF.71 Under the first contract, EUR 1.4 million was dedicated to strengthening the 
capacity of IGAD to promote “resilience” in the HoA. The second contract, for EUR 3.6 
million, was meant to facilitate the establishment of a regime of free movement between 
IGAD members, with the intention of “promoting the regularisation of the high volume 
of informal movement that currently takes place.”72 
Most of these initiatives are currently at initial steps of implementation,73 and this paper, 
it should be stressed, does not aim to provide an evaluation or a critique of any specific 
one of them. These projects are far from identical, many of them are still in the process of 
being shaped, and their full implementation will take time and take different forms. What 
this report does, instead, is examine the experiences of Eritrean migrants in relation to 
the overall approach underlying the Khartoum Process.  
The Khartoum Process as a model of partnership engagement 
The question, however, is whether or not the Khartoum Process as it currently stands is fit 
for purpose to tackle the “challenges posed by the mixed migratory flows of irregular 
migrants, refugees and asylum seekers between countries of origin, transit and 
destination between the Horn of Africa and Europe.”74  
 
69. Better Migration Management, “Better Migration Management Newsletter.” June 2017. 
www.giz.de/en/downloads/201706_BMM%20Newsletter-2nd_issue-final.pdf Accessed 12 October 2017. 
See also, Better Migration Management, “Better Migration Management Fact Sheet.” 
www.giz.de/en/downloads/2017_BMM%20Factsheet%20english.pdf Accessed 12 October 2017. For the project’s website, 
see: The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ), “Better Migration Management.” 
www.giz.de/en/worldwide/40602.html Accessed 12 October 2017.  
70. Khartoum Process, “The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF).” www.khartoumprocess.net/operations/36-the-eu-
emergency-trust-fund-for-africa-eutf Accessed 12 October 2017.  
71. IGAD, “IGAD and EU Commit to Drought Resilience and Free Movement of Persons in the IGAD Region,” 13 December 2016, 
https://igad.int/executive-secretary/1449-igad-and-eu-commit-to-drought-resilience-and-free-movement-of-persons-in-the-
igad-region Accessed 25 August 2017. 
72. IGAD, “Concept Paper: National Consultations Towards the IGAD Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in the IGAD Region” 
August 2017. 
73. See, for instance, BMM, June 2017; Khartoum Process, “Bilateral National level cooperation: Ethiopia and Italy – SINCE.” 
Khartoum Process Newsletter, issue 1. www.khartoumprocess.net/news-and-events/newsletter/issue-1/55-bilateral-national-
level-cooperation-ethiopia-and-italy-since Accessed 12 October 2017.  
74. Rome Declaration, 2. 
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There are several characteristics to the model of partnership underlying the Khartoum 
Process that should be outlined here. First, the Khartoum Process is primarily state centric 
in its policy conception and implementation: it was developed and implemented at 
ministerial level with some participation of international organisations but little to no 
engagement beyond that, and it focuses mainly on building the capacity of policy makers 
and state institutions in the HoA. 
Second, it takes a primarily instrumentalist approach: problems identified are generally 
addressed by means of projects that follow a project logic, with specific interventions 
designed to produce specific results for designated target groups within a specific time 
frame, using project monitoring tools.  
Third, the Khartoum Process is based on a problematic political economy: partnering in 
migration management provides political and economic incentives for partner states, 
most of which are implicated in human rights violations, violations of refugee rights and 
trafficking, and changes the nature of their relationships.  
Fourth, it is regionally “contained”: problems are portrayed as regional in need of regional 
solutions, as opposed to being of global concern and global responsibility. Within this 
paradigm, international actors, such as the EU, help partners in the HoA in finding 
solutions to their “local” problems. 
Finally, the partnership model behind the Khartoum Process is largely driven by 
European interests and demands and is asymmetrical, with the EU and EU states 
providing funding, services and other benefits in return for implementation of migration 
management. This equation incentivises states in the HoA to prioritise economic and 
political interests over attempts to undertake the fundamental reforms needed to tackle 
the root causes of mixed migration. This risk is particularly pronounced because of the 
absence of effective democratic accountability and representation of those (migrants and 
refugees) whose rights are at issue. As noted above, the policy of the EU and European 
states on migration in the HoA has also overshadowed earlier African-led initiatives. 
The model, reflected both in the Khartoum Process and the Anti-Trafficking and Anti-
Smuggling protocols,75 is therefore based on the assumption that the cooperation of 
states and international organisations provides the solution to the problem identified, 
i.e. smuggling and trafficking in human beings and large scale mixed migration more 
broadly. This approach tends to treat cross-border movement, in the form of smuggling 
and trafficking, as an issue of law enforcement rather than as a symptom of deep-seated 
governance problems. 
While law enforcement is an important piece of the puzzle, it neither properly 
acknowledges nor addresses how partner states are responsible for forced migration and 
 
75. Articles 2(c) and 10(2) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Protocol), 2237 
UNTS 319 (entry into force 25 Dec. 2003), and Articles 2 and 14 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, 
Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Smuggling in Persons 
Protocol), 2241 UNTS 507 (entry into force 28 Jan. 2004). 





the violation of human rights (and refugee rights specifically). Instead, the challenges 
faced by states are identified as a lack of capacity in respect of policies, laws and 
institutions in the relevant field.  
Yet a sole focus on targeted, narrow capacity building reduces combating trafficking and 
smuggling to a technocratic, law enforcement exercise. It overlooks the role of state 
authorities in armed conflicts, discrimination and human rights violations, including 
those, like restriction of the right to leave one’s country, which are key factors in 
sustaining demand for smuggling, and reported complicity in trafficking. Capacity 
building in law enforcement and criminal justice is insufficient in systems characterised 
by systemic shortcomings and lack of political will. 
In Sudan, for example, the paramilitary RSF have taken on some responsibility for border 
controls.76 Smuggled and trafficked persons face sanctions and deportation, without any 
process of assessing their protection needs or protection against refoulement. In addition, 
there are serious concerns over the selection and fairness of trials before special tribunals 
convened in Sudan, with suspected traffickers facing the death penalty for a range of 
crimes. Combating trafficking becomes invariably politicised in this context, with 
Sudanese authorities seeking to demonstrate effectiveness while operating in a system 
notorious for its lack of respect for the rule of law.77  
Methodology and broader literature  
These concerns form the framework for this paper, as the paper tests them against the 
data collected during the research. It builds on a body of literature that examines, from 
different perspectives, the relationship between migration policies and the realities of 
migration on the ground; and the ability of migration policies to influence migration 
patterns and trends. The “effectiveness” of migration policies, in particular, has been 
much debated in recent decades. While various scholars and researchers argue that 
migration policies often fail to influence migration flows, others suggest that they do.78 
Several studies have also examined, more specifically, the ways in which migration 
policies influence migrants’ decision-making processes, questioning the extent to which 
restrictive policies can prevent migrants from moving.79 
 
76. Baldo, 2017. 
77. Lutz Oette, “The Khartoum Process policy of engagement and human rights protection in Sudan: Written Evidence submitted 
by the Centre for Human Rights Law to the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on Sudan and South Sudan Inquiry on UK-
Sudan relations – Consequences of Engagement”, 2016. www.soas.ac.uk/human-rights-law/file114315.pdf Accessed 10 
August 2017. 
78. For an overview of the key arguments in this, and a critique of it, see Mathias Czaika and Hein de Haas, “The effectiveness of 
immigration policies.” Population and Development Review 39:3, 2013, p. 487-508.  
79. In the context of Eritrea and the HoA, such research includes: J. Hagen-Zanker and R. Mallett, “Journeys to Europe: the role 
of policy in migrant decision-making.” Overseas Development Institute, 2016. www.odi.org/publications/10317-journeys-
europe-role-policy-migrant-decision-making Accessed 8 August 2017; Milena Belloni, “Refugees as Gamblers: Eritreans 
Seeking to Migrate Through Italy,” Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 14:1, 2016, p. 104-119; Richard Mallett, Jessica 
Hagen-Zanker, Nassim Majidi and Clare Cummings, “Journeys on hold: How policy influences the migration decisions of 
Eritreans in Ethiopia.” Overseas Development Institute, 2017. www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-
documents/11336.pdf Accessed 8 August 2017. 
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Against the backdrop of Europe’s “refugee crisis” and the mass displacement out of Eritrea 
since the early 2000s, a number of studies have been conducted on migration within and 
from the HoA in general, and on Eritrean refugees and diaspora communities in 
particular. Perhaps the most common question researchers have sought to address is 
whether or not those migrating out of Eritrea are “genuine refugees” in terms of the 
definitions and norms established by international refugee law.80 NGOs and academics 
have repeatedly sought to explain why Eritreans continue to leave their homeland in such 
significant numbers, and, what the most appropriate response of neighbouring countries, 
as well as the EU, should be to their plight.  
The “effectiveness” of migration policies, in particular, has been 
much debated in recent decades 
The issue of whether or not Eritreans are “pushed” to flee as a result of persecution and 
abuse at home, or whether they leave the country because of “pull factors” in 
neighbouring countries and in Europe, is much debated. While the distinction between 
“push” and “pull” factors is rarely clear, most empirical studies emphasise the role of the 
former in the context of Eritrea. As Kibreab argues,  
although the flight of the tens of thousands of post-independence Eritrean asylum-seekers 
and refugees has been prompted by the interplay between inextricably interwoven political, 
economic, social and environmental factors, human rights violations, as well as by a powerful 
yearning to benefit from perceived or real opportunities elsewhere, the major drivers have 
been the harmful effects of the indefinite NS and WYDC [national service and Warsai-Yikealo 
Development Campaign] on the livelihoods and well-being of the agelglot [servers] and their 
families.81 
Human rights organisations have also consistently claimed that Eritrea’s poor human 
rights record is a key reason for the mass migration from the country. Human Rights 
Watch (HRW), for instance, argued in 2015 that “the desire to escape military service is a 
primary driver of flight from Eritrea,” and a study by SIHA from the same year similarly 
found that key push factors include military conscription (including the use of girls and 
young women as sex slaves during military service), early marriage, harsh labour 
 
80. Kibreab 2013; SIHA 2015; Amnesty International, “Just Deserters: Why Indefinite National Service in Eritrea Has Created a 
Generation of Refugees.” December 2015; Andreas Holm Røsberg and Kjetil Tronvoll. “Migrants or Refugees? The internal 
and external drivers of migration from Eritrea.” ILPI, February 2017. www.udi.no/globalassets/global/forskning-
fou_i/asylmottak/migrants-or-refugees-internal-and-external-drivers-of-migration-from-eritrea.pdf Accessed 17 August 2017; 
(ILPI 2017) Clare Cummings, Julia Pacitto, Diletta Lauro, and Marta Foresti, “Why people move: understanding the drivers 
and trends of migration to Europe.” Overseas Development Institute, December 2015. www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/10157.pdf Accessed 18 August 2017; Mogos O. Brhane., “Understanding why Eritreans go to 
Europe.” Forced Migration Review, January 2016, 34-35.  
81. Kibreab 2013, 645. 





practices, hunger, religious persecution and the lack of freedom of movement.82 There is 
wide consensus around this viewpoint, which was recently also backed up by the findings 
of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea. In its final report, published 
in June 2016, the Commission held that Eritrean officials “have committed, and continue 
to commit, the crimes of enslavement, imprisonment, enforced disappearance, torture, 
other inhumane acts, persecution, rape and murder.”83 Indeed, this research considers 
that a large proportion of fleeing Eritreans are refugees. 
Researchers have also sought to expose and explain the logic behind the trends of 
movement of people from Eritrea and the HoA. There is a considerable body of research 
that explores the routes that migrants take and the general patterns of irregular 
migration in the region, as well as the networks of human smuggling and trafficking that 
operate within it and their common methods of operation and structures.84 In this 
context, several studies have also focused specifically on human rights violations against 
migrants during their journeys from and within the region.85  
67 interviews were carried out with Eritreans living in  
Ethiopia, Sudan and Europe 
This research builds on this body of literature by engaging specifically with the policy 
framework created by the Khartoum Process. It focuses on the journeys taken by Eritreans, 
and their decision-making processes en route. It contextualises these experiences within 
the measures taken by states in the region, in cooperation with regional and 
international actors, to more effectively combat trafficking and smuggling.  
During the course of the research, 67 interviews were carried out with Eritreans, of which 
28 were women. Interviews took place in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa), Sudan (Khartoum and 
eastern Sudan) and Europe. Most of those interviewed had left Eritrea in the past three 
years, and the majority were under 30. Interviewees were selected through a simple 
snowballing technique that revolved primarily around the pre-existing networks of the 
 
82. HRW, “The Mediterranean Migration Crisis: Why People Flee, What the EU Should Do.” June 2015. 
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/eu0615_web.pdf Accessed 23 October 2017; SIHA 2016. Multiple other studies 
have found the same thing. See, for example, ILPI, 2017.  
83. UNHCR June 2016. 
84. Rachel Humphris, “Refugees and the Rashaida: human smuggling and trafficking from Eritrea to Sudan and Egypt.” UNHCR, 
New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 254. www.refworld.org/docid/5142d9692.html Accessed 2 August 
2017; Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, “Going West: Contemporary mixed migration trends from the Horn of Africa to 
Libya & Europe.” June 2014. 
www.regionalmms.org/images/ResearchInitiatives/Going_West_migration_trends_Libya_Europe_final.pdf Accessed 18 
August 2017; Sahan Foundation and IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP), “Human Trafficking and Smuggling on the Horn of 
Africa-Central Mediterranean Route.” February 2016. www.sahan.eu/wp-content/uploads/HST_Report_FINAL_19ii2016.pdf 
Accessed 18 August 2017; Reitano et al 2017. 
85. HRW 2014 & Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, “Migrant Smuggling in the Horn of Africa: The political economy & 
protection risks.” June 2013. 
www.regionalmms.org/images/ResearchInitiatives/Migrant_Smuggling_in_the_Horn_of_Africa_and_Yemen._report.pdf 
Accessed 18 August 2017; Amnesty International, “A Perfect Storm: The Failure of European Policies in the Central 
Mediterranean.” 6 July 2017. www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur03/6655/2017/en/ Accessed 5 October 2017. 
THE NEED FOR AN EMPIRICALLY GROUNDED EU POLICY ON MIXED MIGRATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
 
 
BACKGROUND  23 
 
interviewers. An interview map was used as a guide for the interviews. People were asked 
about the different choices they faced at various points in their journey; how they made 
the decision to move (both in the first place and then to move onward); their means of 
travel and destination; and the people and institutions they had interacted with on the 
way. 
The security of interviewers and interviewees was paramount throughout the process. In 
order to reassure all of those involved of their anonymity, it was agreed that only minimal 
details of the interviews would be provided in the report. In the case of interviews 
conducted in Europe, this included not mentioning the specific country in which a person 
was living at the time of being interviewed. It is an indication of the fear that many 
Eritreans live with even once they have left their country – fear of their government, of 
traffickers, and of possible deportation – that even this detail was considered dangerous. 
In Ethiopia and Europe, the vast majority of interviews were conducted by Eritreans in 
Tigrigna; and in Sudan, a Sudanese researcher carried out interviews, with the assistance 
of an interpreter where necessary.  
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Testing policy assumptions in 
light of empirical realities 
The findings are presented in light of the assumptions outlined above, that are implicit 
or explicit within the EU migration policy framework of which the Khartoum Process is a 
part.  
Political drivers  
A major assumption underlying the EU migration policy framework is that African state 
institutions lack the capacity to manage migration. Therefore, one way to address this is 
to enhance their capacity through “information-sharing, focused training and capacity 
building, technical assistance and the exchange of best practices…” as well as through 
assistance “in improving national capacity building in the field of migration 
management”.86  
This supposes that African states are essentially weak, failed, or simply absent which leads 
to a strongly instrumentalist approach based on the argument that if you strengthen laws 
and institutions you resolve the problem. However, this approach fails to acknowledge 
the many ways in which state institutions are not only present in people’s lives (even if 
these institutions act in an arbitrary, informal manner), but also contribute to human 
rights violations and displacement and may even be complicit in smuggling and 
trafficking in human beings.87  
From the outset, the Khartoum Process drew strong criticism from civil society and 
sections of the media who warned that it may in fact strengthen the capacity of repressive 
states in the HoA and render the EU both complicit in human rights violations and of 
becoming allies with states that create forced migration. Many were concerned that the 
EU’s reputation as a human rights standard-bearer was in danger of being sacrificed at 
the altar of migration.88  
 
86. Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of the Khartoum Process (EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative), Rome, 28 
Nov. 2014, 4. http://italia2014.eu/media/3785/declaration-of-the-ministerial-conference-of-the-khartoum-process.pdf Accessed 
28 September 2017. 
87. For more examples, particularly in the context of Sudan, see Lutz Oette and Mohamed Abdelsalam Babiker, “Migration 
Control á la Khartoum: EU External Engagement and Human Rights Protection in the Horn of Africa”, Refugee Survey 
Quarterly, 2017. (Oette and Babiker 2017) 
88. “Engagement beyond the Centre: An Inquiry Report on the Future of UK-Sudan Relations.” All Party Parliamentary Group for 
Sudan and South Sudan, February 2017. www.hurriyatsudan.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/APPG-Sudans-report-Feb-
17.pdf Accessed 3 March 2017. 
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Leaving Eritrea: escaping harm? 
The findings, supported by previous research, emphasise the extent to which the Eritrean 
state has a powerful and strongly negative presence in people’s lives. When asked why they 
left Eritrea, repeatedly interviewees pointed to the Eritrean state as the structural driver. 
Not surprisingly, people talked about “indefinite military service” as a key reason. One 18-
year-old man now living in Europe said that he did not want the same fate as his brothers: 
“My elder brothers were taken to the military camp and never came back.”89  
An Eritrean woman now working as a nurse in Khartoum, said “I'm a professional nurse, 
I'm not a soldier. How can I return to military camps again? The government wants all of 
us to be soldiers… Then I heard that one of my colleagues was arrested because he refused 
to do military service, so then I knew I could not stay.”90 A man living in Addis Ababa 
explained that he left after being imprisoned: “I was imprisoned and punished after I 
prolonged my leave without their authorisation... They tie your arms from behind your 
back which causes the blood to clot and causes injury to the hands.”91 His story was 
echoed by others who spoke of imprisonment and torture at the hands of the authorities. 
“My elder brothers were taken to the military camp  
and never came back” 
Repeatedly, young people described how the moment they received a letter requesting 
them to start military service they decided to leave. As one young woman said, “A letter 
was sent to me … saying I must leave home for military training. That is when I decided to 
leave my home country.”92 Many others spoke about how the military came to their 
houses looking for people absconding from national service: if they are caught, they are 
sent to prison. As one young man now living in Addis Ababa said, “My parents passed away 
so I deserted my assignment in the military to take care of my younger siblings. As a result, 
the military police were always coming home looking for me to arrest me. Every night, I 
was hiding myself in my relatives’ home. Finally, I decided to leave my home country to 
escape arrest.”93  
The fact that people need permission to leave the country, and there is tight control at the 
border thus necessitating the use of smugglers to leave, further points to the levels of state 
repression in people’s lives. Smugglers are expensive and people know they are taking a 
risk when they use their services. As an interviewee said: “…the smuggler might turn out 
to be part of the government. Then you are really in trouble.”94 Furthermore, leaving the 
country does not shed concerns around safety. As the same young man went on to say: 
 
89. Interview with Eritrean man, Europe, July 2017. Left Eritrea in 2014. 
90. Interview with Eritrean woman, Khartoum, Sudan, June 2017. Left Eritrea in 2015. 
91. Interview with Eritrean man, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, June 2017. Left Eritrea in 2015. 
92. Interview with Eritrean woman, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2017. Left Eritrea in 2016. 
93. Interview with Eritrean man, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, June 2017. Left Eritrea in 2014. 
94. Interview with Eritrean man, Khartoum, Sudan, July 2017. Left Eritrea in 2015. 
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“now I am unemployed. I can’t support myself and my siblings at home. I worry about 
their safety all the time – the security might come after them because of what I’ve done.”95  
“…the smuggler might turn out to be part of the government.  
Then you are really in trouble” 
Protection afforded by neighbouring countries when crossing 
borders? 
There is a further assumption that states neighbouring Eritrea are, at least in principle, 
capable of providing protection to those leaving Eritrea. Yet the geopolitical context 
means that this is unlikely to be the case, given the multiple interests that are at play – 
and, in some instances, the lack of respect for the rule of law. The reception that people 
received at the different borders with Eritrea is revealing in this regard. 
Whilst leaving Eritrea was seen as extremely dangerous, once over the border, their 
reception by different border guards varied. Those who first arrived in Djibouti recounted 
how they were badly received “When I crossed over, the Djiboutian soldiers saw me. They 
treated me badly. They took me to a prison for investigation. So then I decided to go to 
Ethiopia.”96  
“They gave us water and food” 
By contrast, all of those who crossed into Ethiopia talked of a positive reception by border 
guards. Again, this is not surprising given the history of conflict between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. After all, it would be no surprise to an Ethiopian border guard that someone 
would want to flee Eritrea. As one woman said, “We met Ethiopian soldiers along the way 
and we turned to them by ourselves… They treated us very well and welcomed us warmly. 
They asked us why and how we crossed, who helped us, and then they sent me to the 
refugee camp.”97 Her story was echoed by many of the other interviewees: “They treated 
me very well. They gave me a cup of tea and bread… They informed me of the rights I have 
as a refugee and took me to the camp.”98 There was little discrepancy between those who 
had crossed over the border prior to 2014 when the Khartoum Process was initiated, and 
after: all reported that they were treated well. 
Even a man dressed in Eritrean army uniform was received well: “When we reached the 
foot of the mountain, the Ethiopian soldiers saw us…It was not a new incident to them; 
many Eritrean soldiers like us had come to them using the same route. So, they are always 
 
95. Interview with Eritrean man Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, June 2017. Left Eritrea in 2014. 
96. Interview with Eritrean man, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, June 2017. Left Eritrea in 2015. 
97. Interview with Eritrean woman, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2017. Left Eritrea in 2016. 
98. Interview with Eritrean man, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2017. Left Eritrea in 2014. 
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on the look for new comers. They gave us water and food. After that, they drove us for three 
days and reached Adigrat. We stayed in Adigrat for two days. Then, I was sent to Enda-
abaguna [screening centre]. Finally, to Hitsats refugee camp.”99  
For those who crossed into Sudan, some told of a positive reception from border guards. 
One man, now in Kassala in eastern Sudan, said that he had walked with a number of 
friends for five days in order to cross from Eritrea into Sudan: “Our only plan was to avoid 
[Eritrean] military or police areas… Immediately after we crossed the border we were 
stopped by Sudanese police. They took us to a place with many other Eritreans, and then 
they took us to a Sudanese organisation where they registered us and took us to Shagarab 
refugee camp.”100 As he went on to say, “the Sudanese police at the borders will help you 
and take you to the UN camps.”101 Again, there was no evident change before and after 
2014 in peoples’ treatment at the Sudan border. 
“the Sudanese police at the borders will help you and  
take you to the UN camps.” 
Others, however, talked of the danger at the Eritrea-Sudan border, where the Rashaida are 
known to operate and talked of their fear of meeting a “bad” border guard who might be 
complicit in selling them to the traffickers. One woman, when asked if she had 
encountered any border guards when entering Sudan, said that she had, but that the 
memory of the encounter was too traumatic for her to speak about. Another man told of 
how the Sudanese authorities had protected them from the Rashaida: “When we got to 
Kassala, the Rashaida tribes or human traffickers found us. But we managed to run away 
to where Sudan security members were, and they brought us to the UNHCR refugee camp.”  
The contrast in experiences, therefore, points to the multiple variables that impact 
whether or not someone gets safely over the border into Sudan. The power that individual 
border guards have, either to facilitate someone’s journey or to lead them into serious 
harm, is considerable. Furthermore, and as discussed below, any positive narratives 
around their initial reception at the border were soon counterbalanced by the treatment 
received at the hands of security forces once they were inside the country.  
In addition, interviewees who had reached Europe described how smugglers were seen 
giving money to border guards when they crossed from Sudan to Libya: “There was a check 
point [where people were wearing police uniforms] when we crossed to Libya and the 
people who drove us paid some amount to them... I don’t know how much they paid. It 
must have been small money. Otherwise they would have made us pay it.”102 
 
99. Interview with Eritrean man, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, June 2017. Left Eritrea in 2016. 
100. Interview with Eritrean man, Kassala, Sudan, July 2017. Left Eritrea in 2016. 
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Therefore, the experience of interviewees with border guards ranged from receiving 
assistance and protection, to them turning a blind eye, to their engagement in selling 
people to traffickers. The conduct of border guards largely appears to be individualised 
and not reflective of a general policy. Reforming this response to ensuring uniform 
protection for those who cross borders – particularly refugees – will be difficult. 
Understanding how this could even be approached requires understanding of the 
situation. Is the lack of uniformity in response the result of a government policy that 
allows discretion? Or is it the result of a lack of capacity to enforce a governmental 
standard? In that context, there are serious questions as to whether or not 
straightforward capacity-building is a viable response.  
Root causes? 
Another assumption that EU migration policies draw on is the idea that access to 
employment and livelihoods and “sustainable development” will reduce migration from 
Africa, despite the fact that most policy documents recognise that migration is the result 
of a combination of social, economic and political factors, including violent conflicts. And 
while there is certainly rhetorical recognition of the fact that drivers of displacement in 
the region are political, when translated into programmatic activity this “political” edge 
is often diluted or removed altogether.  
For example, according to the Rome Declaration, the Khartoum Process focuses on 
“promoting sustainable development in countries of origin and transit in order to 
address the root causes of irregular migration.” Even though these root causes are not 
discussed, it is stated that they are to be addressed through “efforts aimed at eradicating 
poverty and realising Millennium Development Goals.”103  
while there is certainly rhetorical recognition of the fact that 
drivers of displacement in the region are political, when 
translated into programmatic activity this “political” edge is 
often diluted or removed altogether. 
However, addressing deficits in development are unlikely to address the issue of 
migration in situations where economic factors are not the primary drivers of migration. 
Perceiving cross-border movement in the HoA primarily as “voluntary” is not only 
empirically unsustainable, it is also likely to be counterproductive from a policy 
perspective. Without acknowledging the governance problems, or discrimination that 
impact on economic advancement, any solutions will at best only partly address the 
problem and at worst increase disparities and prejudice. In the specific case of Eritrea, it 
 
103. Rome Declaration, 4.  
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seems clear that while both political repression and poverty act as drivers and these are 
not unrelated, political repression appears to be the dominant issue. 
The issues of human trafficking and smuggling and the institutional responses to them 
are therefore often disconnected from any meaningful engagement with the political 
context that recognises why people leave their countries of origin in the first place and 
resort to irregular migration; and their experience in exile. While socio-economic factors 
play an important role in driving migration, irregular migration as a whole is not simply 
a socio-economic phenomenon. Such narratives obscure other more fundamental factors 
that drive migration that cannot be addressed solely by enhancing socio-economic 
development. 
Even where economics is the primary driver, the assumption that offering aid will reduce 
migration is problematic. The empirical evidence that demonstrates a link between 
development aid and reduced migration remains weak. Depicting lack of development 
and economic opportunities as main causes of migration is overly narrow and risks 
downplaying other factors. In fact, some have actually argued that the opposite is true: 
“Contradicting conventional interpretations of African migration being essentially 
driven by poverty, violence and underdevelopment, increasing migration out of Africa 
seems rather to be driven by processes of development and social transformation which 
have increased Africans’ capabilities and aspirations to migrate, a trend which is likely to 
continue in the future.”104  
Finally, it is important to understand that economic and political considerations can be 
deeply intertwined. Economic measures can be used against political opponents, and bad 
political decisions can have a disastrous impact on the economy. 
Economic or political drivers? 
The over emphasis on economic motivations for flight is also challenged by the 
interviews, which demonstrate that economic and political drivers are all but impossible 
to tease apart – or, put another way, that economic drivers are intensely political in 
nature. Specifically, in the Eritrean context indefinite military service inevitably makes 
people economically vulnerable. As one man said, “I was put in indefinite military service 
and my family were starving to death as a result.”105 
Time and again, interviewees talked of leaving in order to access livelihoods, improve 
their education or get medical assistance. But just below the surface of these more 
proximate drivers of migration were the political structures that created the economic 
need in the first place. For instance, one man, pointed to the complexity of factors that 
lead people to leave their families and homes, in which politics and economics are 
inextricably linked. He said:  
 
104. Marie-Laurence Flahaux and Hein De Haas, “African migration: trends, patterns, drivers.” Comparative Migration Studies 4:1, 
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105. Interview with Eritrean man, Europe, July 2017. Left Eritrea in 2015. 
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My father has been in military service since I can remember. He used to send us a little money, 
and my mother doesn’t work. It was difficult for me and my siblings to go to school. I hid from 
the authorities for two years when they started calling me for my national service. …I found 
some friends who were willing to leave and I left with them. The local authorities detained my 
mum for several weeks.106  
A woman living in Shagarab refugee camp had to leave when her husband was detained 
and she could not support her two children on her own.107 As another man said, “The idea 
of leaving the country starts when you stop going to school. This is the end in Eritrea. No 
education, no job, military service, roundups [gifas]. Wa’e! [an expression of 
frustration].”108 This quote demonstrates the extent to which “political” and “economic” 
drivers are enmeshed. 
It stands to reason, therefore, that any policy approach or programmatic intervention 
that separates out the political drivers of conflict and repression from the economic 
impact of those drivers – or that is blind to the connection between the two – is likely to 
contain huge risks: protection risks for those on the move, and significant reputational 
risks for those providing assistance. This argument is valid both for countries of origin 
and countries of transit, as outlined below in relation to the refugee policy environment.  
Informed choices? 
EU policies are contradictory on the assumptions made as to why migrants decide to 
move. Some state it is because the migrants are ill-informed or misled, while others state 
it is because the migrants are exposed to correct information. 
Several policies are based on the assumption that people choose to migrate irregularly 
because they are unaware of the risks involved or of legal migration options available to 
them, and that targeted awareness campaigns will expose people to information that they 
otherwise lack access to, and thus reduce irregular migration. The Khartoum Process, for 
example, aims to assist “the national authorities in stepping up prevention measures, 
such as information campaigns to improve awareness of risks of irregular migration…”109 
A similar assumption is that individuals migrate irregularly or use “informal 
intermediaries” because legal migration procedures are “non-transparent and over-
bureaucratic.”110 Strategic communications, therefore, has been a primary response to 
this assumption.  
At the same time, other policies seem to assume that people migrate irregularly because 
they are exposed to correct information. In the European Agenda on Migration it is argued 
that “one of the incentives for irregular migrants is the knowledge that the EU's return 
 
106. Interview with Eritrean man, Europe, June 2017. Left Eritrea in 2016. 
107. Interview with Eritrean woman, Shagarab refugee camp, Sudan, October 2017. Left Eritrea in 2016. 
108. Interview with Eritrean man, Europe, July 2017. Left Eritrea in 2014. 
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system… works imperfectly.”111 Finally, another argument is that migration is driven by 
increased access to wrong or misleading information: the EU-HoA Regional Plan 2015-
2020, argues that youths are encouraged to migrate as a result of “heightened exposure to 
international and social media,” which “raises increased expectations that are often not 
met.”112  
These assumptions might not be entirely wrong. However, they certainly require a more 
nuanced, evidence-based examination. Not all migrants have access to the same 
information and not all of them judge the reliability of the information they are exposed 
to from different sources in the same manner. In particular, the assumptions bound up 
in this do not adequately take account of the fact that issues of access to information have 
to be examined in light of the more complex questions of decision-making and risk-
taking in the context of forced displacement. Thus, they also fail to sufficiently take into 
account the agency of migrants.  
A clear understanding of the risks 
In fact, the findings point to several aspects around who people get information from, 
and the nature of that information. First, it was clear that most of those who travel have 
a clear understanding of the fact that they are taking a huge risk to their own safety. This 
was particularly striking when talking to people in Ethiopia and Sudan who were 
thinking about moving to Europe through Libya. Once people had successfully left Eritrea, 
the journey through Libya and by boat to Europe was broadly seen as the most dangerous 
part of the route.  
most of those who travel have a clear understanding of the fact 
that they are taking a huge risk to their own safety 
As one man said, “My friends in Europe told me the challenges they faced along the route. 
Some of them were kidnapped and paid about USD 4,000. Others died in a car accident 
along the Sahara Desert. Two of my friends lost their lives in the Lampedusa tragedy.”113 
One woman said that two of her cousins had died in the Sahara, but stated she was still 
planning to try and reach Europe.114 
Many specifically talked about the danger of falling into the hands of criminals: “I heard 
migrants are left behind in the desert by the smugglers or their organs are being 
harvested to be sold for a lot of money.”115 When asked where this information came from, 
he replied, “friends.” As one woman said, “I know refugees are kidnapped, sold, even killed. 
 
111. A European Agenda on Migration – COM (2015) 240 final, 9. 
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They don’t give the migrants enough water or food for days. They beat and torture men. 
They rape the women. They abandon refugees when they’re injured. I heard so many bad 
things from others who have already gone through but I have no other way but to travel 
through the same route.”116 
For some, the increased danger was too much and they changed their minds: “When I left 
home I planned to reach up to the Mediterranean and then use a boat to Europe. But now 
my plan has changed. I plan now to go to Juba, South Sudan to work there instead of being 
smuggled to Europe.”117 Most, however, remained resolute. As another man explained, “My 
plan [to go to Europe through Libya] will not change even if it means facing all the 
horrifying experience shown on social media. I have already decided to go. And I know 
what I will face during my journey but the worst that will come is death. Or I might be 
lucky enough to get there alive like all those who crossed safely. It will not be easy but I 
have no other choice.”118  
“the worst that will come is death. Or I might be lucky enough to 
get there alive like all those who crossed safely” 
However, although there was a general understanding of the fact that the journey would 
be dangerous, the specifics of that danger, and how to avoid them, were less well known. 
As a man who had reached Europe said,  
It is common to chat on Facebook, WhatsApp or Viber with friends who are already in Europe 
about how they get there. There are also many rumours you hear in the community 
everywhere… I must ask the smugglers or people who know them very well about the journey... 
It is difficult to trust them, but there is no other way to find information.119  
Likewise, when asked how much information he had before he left Eritrea another 
interviewee replied: “It was only rumours, I had no solid information. I used to hear that 
the Ethiopian soldiers welcome you warmly when you cross over and that there were no 
kidnappers along the way [to Ethiopia].”120 This was echoed by another response to the 
same question: “I had little information. What I had was from friends in exile. The 
information I had was that the journey was not easy, but that the Ethiopian soldiers 
welcome those who cross over and that Eritreans can live freely in Addis Ababa.”121 They 
had enough information to leave Eritrea, therefore, but had considerably less certainty 
about what might happen after that.  
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This points to a gap in the information that many people have: they know that some 
smugglers are relatively “good” and others will sell you to traffickers, but discerning which 
groups and individuals fall into which category presents a considerable challenge.  
A family affair 
Second, the findings point to the crucial role played by families in decision-making 
processes and in regards to communication during and about the journey. When asked 
where people got their information from, most mentioned friends and family. In the case 
of the latter, this was because families generally have to be involved in the decision to 
travel as they are the ones who pay the smugglers. Many of the interviewees told of how 
smugglers told them that they could pay them once they reached their destination – for 
the most part either Libya or the Sudan/Eritrea border town of Kassala. They were then 
taken hostage until their families paid up. Those who did not pay were then sold to 
traffickers. As one woman, who is now living in Europe, said, “Before I left I discussed the 
journey with my sister in Sweden. We knew it was risky, even deadly. The burden was on 
me to take the risk and I did so. I did not tell anybody else about my decision to leave 
Eritrea.”122 Another man told of how, soon after arriving in Hitsats refugee camp in 
Ethiopia, he contacted his sister via Facebook. “I told her that I arrived in Ethiopia safely. 
I also told her of the journey’s hardships because my younger brother plans to cross over 
the border as well.”123 
Others had talked to some members of their family about their intentions, but had 
deliberately not told other family members because they knew they would try and 
discourage them. This was particularly the case with younger people not telling their 
parents. One woman, whose sister had arranged for a smuggler to take her out of Eritrea, 
said: “When I got the idea of travel last time, I consulted my father and he refused to allow 
me to move. He thought that this way is risky and dangerous. So this time I didn’t consult 
him, I only called him when I arrived in Kassala. His words over the phone were very 
sad…”124 Another woman living in Addis Ababa talked of the fact that her family is not 
prepared to help her journey any further: “My parents and sisters [who are in England and 
Switzerland] do not support the idea of traveling through the Sahara and crossing the 
Mediterranean Sea. They are against it. They say it is too dangerous so they are not willing 
to pay for my journey. So now I am stuck here.”125 She later told of how her brother was 
kidnapped in the Sahara and her sister in the UK had to pay USD 2,000 to ensure his release. 
Others talked about their desire to protect relatives from encountering the dangers they 
had been through, “I contact [my family] through Facebook. I have told them about the 
challenges I had crossing the border and have told them not to move a step out of their 
home country.”126 However others are also reluctant to share the reality of their lives post 
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flight. A young man in Addis Ababa talked about how he communicates with his relatives 
back in Eritrea: “I always tell them that I am doing fine even if I am not most of the time. 
My younger brother plans to cross but I am against it. My parents want to come and visit 
but I don’t want them to.”127  
The role of families points to the fact that ultimately people look to those who they most 
trust for information. As stated in the methodology, the level of fear among Eritreans 
inside and outside of the country was evident in the reluctance people had to talk with 
interviewers. There is a huge fear that any form of communication could be dangerous to 
them or their relatives, and therefore there is a huge lack of trust in sources of 
information from people they do not know personally. This is neither new nor surprising. 
As one man said, “It is scary to talk about leaving the country. It can get you killed.”128 In 
a context in which most Eritreans are constantly concerned that they are being 
monitored and watched, the relationship with the messenger is crucial.  
“It is scary to talk about leaving the country. It can get you killed.” 
This has significant policy implications. If people are not willing to share information 
except with those who are closest to them, public awareness campaigns will have limited 
impact as they will not necessarily be built around accurate information. And even if 
accurate information could be gathered and targeted at the right people, serious 
questions remain as to whether they would believe it.  
Taking a calculated risk?  
Third, the interviews provide a glimpse into the terrible impact of separation on 
individuals and families. Each journey represents extraordinarily complex and heart-
wrenching decision-making processes that involve or exclude multiple family members. 
Some are prepared to offer money to relatives to make a dangerous journey despite 
knowing the risks; others deem the risk too great and yet know that asking family 
members to continue living in Eritrea presents its own risks. The net impact is that 
families are being pulled apart. As one young woman living in Khartoum said, “Right now, 
I'm here alone. My younger brother was here in Sudan, but now he got smuggled to the UK. 
The other one moved to Juba [South Sudan]. The rest of my family members live in Eritrea. 
I have nine people in my family, five brothers and four sisters. But I am alone.”129 
As another young woman said with defiance, “My brother [in Canada] doesn’t agree with 
my idea to travel to Europe through the Sahara Desert. I am trying to convince him. 
Otherwise, I will simply leave without informing him and he will be forced to pay it when 
I reach Khartoum.”130  
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Most of all, people talked about the fact that there was not really a decision to be made as 
they saw no alternative. For some, all the information in the world, including by means of 
campaigns and conversations by trusted community actors, would not change their 
decision-making. One woman described all the horrors she had heard about crossing to 
Europe, but then said “I don’t have any other choice. So, I am planning to cross the Sahara 
regardless of the threats that I know lie ahead.”131  
decisions to cross borders irregularly despite extreme risks are 
often taken when alternative options are perceived to be equally 
bad, or worse. 
Much of the international response to discourage people from moving to Europe is 
predicated on the assumption that people have a choice not to move, and that not 
migrating is the right choice for them to make. However, as the findings show, this is not 
the way most migrants understand this dilemma: decisions to cross borders irregularly 
despite extreme risks are often taken when alternative options are perceived to be equally 
bad, or worse. They are unable to return to Eritrea, they have failed to find access to safety 
and livelihoods in Sudan or Ethiopia. Therefore, moving onwards – despite the known 
risks – seems like the best available option for their own and their family’s future. In 
other words, migrants do not choose to move because they are ill-informed about the 
dangers they will face but because they calculate that the alternatives will leave them and 
their families worse off. In other words, what policy makers see as an ill-informed 
decision can also be seen as calculated risk-taking taking into account a huge number of 
variables.132 
The level of risk people are willing to take inevitably increases as the stakes go higher, and 
no amount of persuasion about the dangers of the journey will work, as these have 
already been taken into account. The only thing that will work is a policy approach that 
genuinely offers a viable alternative – and specifically one that gives people a future. 
The availability of legal channels of migration is important in this context. Many of those 
who migrate irregularly do so not because legal migration procedures are simply “non-
transparent and over-bureaucratic,”133 but because it is clear to them that the legal routes 
are so limited for people in their status and situation, that they cannot rely on them as 
viable solutions. In other words, there is a need not only to communicate the existence of 
legal channels of migration and make sure people are aware of them, but to significantly 
expand these channels in order to guarantee that they represent reasonable alternatives 
to irregular migration.  
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This applies equally to providing better alternatives for Eritrean migrants and refugees in 
neighbouring countries. While some Eritreans consider staying in neighbouring 
countries, particularly Ethiopia, most of them are determined to leave the region 
altogether. The prospect of improved livelihoods does not offset the multiple 
disadvantages they face: encampment, lack of freedom of movement, discrimination, and 
inadequate legal protection, including the risk of being forcibly returned to one’s home 
country. In the absence of genuinely durable solutions, the motivation to leave will 
remain strong.  
In the absence of genuinely durable solutions, the motivation to 
leave will remain strong 
Trafficking versus smuggling? 
The Khartoum Process assumes a problematic link between human trafficking and 
smuggling, and between the appropriate responses to these two practices. While the two 
are related, and both trafficking and smuggling constitute criminal offences, it conflates 
the two crimes and fails to recognise that some people who are engaged in smuggling may 
be offering a needed service. In a context in which many of those who are moving 
“irregularly” are compelled to do so, irregular migration is not a criminal offence, and 
should not be addressed as such.134 Therefore, policies that link smuggling and 
trafficking and seek to combat both together fail to acknowledge that crossing borders 
irregularly is often the only option that refugees and migrants have in order to exercise 
their legitimate right to seek protection.135 
Smugglers as humanitarians? Leaving Eritrea 
A few of those interviewed described how they had left Eritrea without the use of 
smugglers. For the most part, these were people who lived near the border with Ethiopia 
or Sudan, and who found an opportunity to cross: “Because I used to live near the border I 
have always heard stories of how people normally cross the border. I was not in need of 
further information from others… When I set out it was only to Sudan. I never knew what 
will happen there and after.”136 Others talked of how they were stationed near the border 
while doing their national service and had run away when they had seen an opportunity. 
As one man said, “I was a member of the Eritrean defence forces in the frontline near 
Assab. So, it was easier for me to cross over the border into Djibouti without the help of 
smugglers.”137  
 
134. See Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention: “The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal 
entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened” 
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While some were successful, several of those who left without paying a smuggler talked 
about the difficulties they encountered as a result. One man was kidnapped by a person 
he described as a “Rashaida trafficker” just after crossing the border into Sudan:  
He kidnapped us and put us with other victims. They tortured us for about six weeks to extort 
ransom, beating us with wood and plastic sticks. We were 13 Eritreans, including six young 
girls. See these are some of the scars that I still have. They had guns, knives, and swords. They 
chained us. None of us could escape. After six weeks, I was released with two others because 
our families paid the ransom. Then the traffickers took us to Khartoum. […] The traffickers 
demanded USD 15,000, but I do not know how much of it was paid.138 
Most, however, described using a smuggler to leave the country as they felt unable to leave 
without their assistance. As one man living in Addis Ababa said, “The idea [of leaving] had 
been at the back of my mind for years. It was when I found someone who could help in 
crossing the border that the idea became clearer and I decided to move.”139 These 
smugglers were normally contacted by family members – often outside of the country – 
who then contacted the person wanting to leave Eritrea and helped them across. Even 
with the use of smugglers, however, people described dangerous and often physically 
demanding journeys over the border into either Ethiopia or Sudan.  
The cost of smugglers – and the level of assistance an individual can afford – generally 
determines who does and does not leave the country. Most of those who left talked of a 
relative in Europe who had agreed to pay for – and often to arrange – a smuggler to help 
them leave. As one man said, “My cousin in Norway negotiated with the smugglers’ 
associates in Addis Ababa. Then he informed me via Facebook when and how to leave, and 
where to meet the smuggler.”140 It was striking that many of those interviewed for this 
research had a source of finances within their family (generally outside of Eritrea) and 
many of them had tertiary qualifications.  
Those who were able to pay more generally had to do less walking than those who could 
not afford the higher fees; and those who are very poor and who do not live near the 
borders are generally unable to leave at all. Just moving within Eritrea is not permitted 
without special permits, let alone crossing the border. As one man said, “All people who 
are not free of national service in Eritrea want to cross and leave their country. But not all 
can do it. Because not everyone can afford a smuggler or has money to go to Libya. So, it is 
a matter of finance rather than age or gender.”141 Or, as an Eritrean woman who had 
recently walked for five days, guided by smugglers, to leave the country, said: “Those who 
live closer to the border with Ethiopia cross on their own and without the knowledge of 
their parents… a lack of money doesn’t stop them.”142 
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One woman described her journey out of Eritrea:  
I left Asmara for Dekemhare. I took a bus and reached the place of appointment on 18 April 
2016 at around 4 pm. The smuggler told me to wear a red band on my left wrist and gave me a 
code through the internet. I waited for half an hour and then he came. He spoke to me and I 
gave him the codes. Then he took me to a house, there were three teenagers. He told me that we 
will all go together…. [W]e left the house and started our journey on foot at around 8 pm. We 
travelled through mountainous areas for two nights. We would hide during the day and only 
travel in the night. I was very tired but the smuggler carried me many times. The route was 
very long, the smuggler told me it was only a ten hour walk but it took us two nights. I was 
afraid of being caught and this gave me a reason to keep on going when I was tired to my 
bones. Once we reached Belesa River the smuggler told us this was as far as he goes. He gave us 
some directions and told us that we will only find Ethiopian soldiers from this point on. After 
an hour’s walk, we were found by Ethiopian soldiers. They gave us food and water. After that 
they sent us to Gherhu-Srnai. From there we were transferred to Enda-baguna Screening 
Centre. After I was registered with UNHCR, I was sent to Hitsats refugee camp where I stayed 
for some time and came to Addis Ababa.143 
Her story was typical, and many emphasised the dangers that they encountered. People 
described being shot at on the way; of having to carry friends who were exhausted or had 
been injured; and of terrible thirst when their water supply ran out. One man described 
how, out of the seven people who left together with a smuggler, only himself and the 
smuggler made it across the border: “The others were all caught when we were crossing 
before we reached Mereb River [a seasonal river that constitutes part of the international 
border between Eritrea and Ethiopia].”144  
“not everyone can afford a smuggler or has money to go to Libya” 
Smugglers from within communities 
Many described how the smugglers – or their point of contact with the smugglers – were 
from within their communities, either the local communities in which they were living, 
or in transnational communities. One woman described how her husband, who had 
already left the country, found a smuggler through his friends: “We used the internet to 
talk about it. He would talk to the smuggler’s associates and they in turn would bring 
messages to him from the smuggler. He would pass the messages to me then. The 
smuggler is based in Eritrea.”145 A young woman living in a refugee camp in eastern Sudan 
told of how her brother said that he would find her an “honest” smuggler. As one man 
said, “Usually migrants prefer to use a smuggler who they already know or who is known 
to our families. In fact, the person I used I actually didn’t know him very well, but my 
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friends knew him and they say a lot of good things about him.”146 Others talked about 
how they found smugglers living in the refugee camps in Ethiopia and Sudan: “I found 
the smugglers with the help of some Eritrean friends in Sudan. The smugglers are from 
the refugee community themselves and it is not difficult to find them…”147 It points to an 
informal referral system that appears to be operating as a form of protection. 
“The smugglers are from the refugee community themselves and it 
is not difficult to find them…” 
As a result, the ongoing success of smugglers depends on their reputation within 
communities. As one woman said when describing the smugglers she used:  
I did not want to say anything about the smugglers but now I am going to tell you more. The 
smuggler who eased my journey to Italy is an Eritrean who lives in Saudi Arabia. He is a rich 
man who smuggled many people for long years. He has a Sudanese passport and he travels a 
lot between Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. I met him in Egypt... Sometimes, he also smuggles 
people to the US through Mexico. I am not sure how, though. This smuggler is very famous in 
Cairo and most Eritreans prefer him to facilitate their journeys.148  
When asked if she thought this man was helping people, she replied, “I guess so. Not just 
by putting people on boats but also by creating alternatives for many people. I do not 
know. He might be a criminal but still he helps people. He is successful.”149 Her positive 
perception of her smuggler, however, was inextricably linked to the fact that she had not 
been kidnapped during her journey, and she is now living in Europe.  
The terrible cost of trafficking on migrants 
However, the line between smugglers as “humanitarians” helping people to flee a 
repressive state, and abuse, is painfully thin. People are acutely aware of this. Some are 
able to minimise the risks. As one man said, “I have never used bad smugglers. Most of the 
decisions to travel were made by myself. This is partly because I speak their language and 
I can pretend to be Sudanese in some instances.”150 However, many are not. As one woman 
said, “Just because [smugglers] offer a service, it does not mean that people are 
comfortable or like it. I felt very upset to be owned by others, criminals. But, I could do 
nothing.”151  
People made a clear distinction between smuggling as a form of protection and 
assistance; and the abuses that evolved out of smuggling, particularly where people fell 
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into the hands of criminals. As previously mentioned, groups, generally identified as 
“Rashaida” or “Rashaida traffickers”, are known to operate along the Eritrea-Sudan border. 
For this reason, many talked about the fact that crossing into Ethiopia was safer than 
crossing into Sudan. They previously dominated the Sinai route to Israel and, while only 
a small number of the group are thought to be involved in trafficking, they are part of a 
wider network that likely includes Eritrean collaborators, other Sudanese, and elements 
within the Sudanese law enforcement authorities.152  
The link between the role of smugglers and the abuses associated with trafficking has 
been well documented.153 Not surprisingly, therefore, people’s descriptions of their 
journeys pointed to a broader pattern in which their journeys became increasingly 
dangerous – often as the original linkage between a person on the move and the original 
smuggler got weaker – and the price goes up. One man, who had crossed the border into 
Sudan on his own, then talked of how he did not know how to get to Khartoum and 
needed to find a smuggler. He found someone inside Shagarab refugee camp but, as he 
said, “I did not know him or if I could trust him.” As this demonstrates, once the linkage 
with their communities is broken, those who are on the move have less orientation and 
therefore less information that can be a source of protection. He then described his 
journey to Khartoum:  
At night, the smugglers brought six pickup cars to our place of meeting. The cars belong to 
Rashaida. They took 80 of us – we were more than 120 people escaping from Shagarab to 
Khartoum. Those cars belonged to the Rashaida. After traveling for one day and night, one of 
the cars crashed, and some people got hurt really badly. I don't know what happened to them 
because our car moved on towards a place called Hajer. In this place, we paid the money to the 
smugglers. I had heard that if you don’t pay them enough money, they will detain you there. I 
stayed for four days in Hajer together with a lot of Eritreans. And then the smugglers took us 
to Khartoum.154  
The journey from Khartoum to Libya became even more dangerous – and more expensive. 
One man described leaving Sudan: “The most difficult part of my journey was when 24 
people were put in a big tanker which previously was used to transport fuel. We started at 
about 11 am through the very hot Libyan desert. And we had to travel until 4 pm. The 
police briefly stopped us on the way- I think it was still in Sudan – and the driver bribed 
them. We were all suffocating and I thought I was going to die. Many did die and those of 
us who lived only escaped narrowly.”155 Once in Libya, the horrific levels of abuse 
migrants suffer has been well documented. As one interviewee said, “The traffickers who 
took me to Libya raped many girls on the way. Every night, they take the girls, rape them, 
and return them back to us.”156 
 
152. Laurie Lijnders and Sara Robinson, “From the Horn of Africa to the Middle East: Human trafficking of Eritrean asylum seekers 
across borders.” www.antitraffickingreview.org/index.php/atrjournal/article/view/36/57 Accessed 10 September 2017. 
153. Reitano et al, 2017.  
154. Interview with Eritrean man, Khartoum, Sudan, June 2017. Left Eritrea in 2014. 
155. Interview with Eritrean man, Europe, July 2017. Left Eritrea in 2014. 
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As the danger and levels of abuse increases, so does the cost – both the agreed upon fee, 
and the additional money that might be needed on the way. It was telling that, when 
asked how much it would cost them to travel to Europe, in Addis Ababa people mentioned 
figures of approximately USD 3,000 to 4,000, while in Khartoum most talked about 
significantly higher sums, from USD 7,000 upwards. Every time a person is kidnapped, 
their families have to pay ransom. As one interviewee in Europe said, “You cannot trust 
smugglers… I was kidnapped four times between Sudan and Tripoli. Every time I was 
kidnapped, my relatives had to pay money except once that I escaped. In Libya, my 
relatives and family had to pay around USD 8,000, which is four times the original 
agreement with the smuggler. My relatives paid USD 2,000 three times when I was 
kidnapped and USD 2,000, which was the original agreement with the smuggler.”157 
“You cannot trust smugglers… I was kidnapped four times 
between Sudan and Tripoli. Every time I was kidnapped, my 
relatives had to pay money except once that I escaped” 
Not surprisingly, therefore, people were angry at the way they were exploited. As one man 
said, “On the way, I have seen women raped and become sex slaves of the cruel traffickers. 
I have also seen young children starved to death. These groups are very vulnerable. They 
are always victims of the smuggling.”158 
Once again, the impact not just on the individuals who are victims of this abuse, but on 
their whole families, was emphasised. One young man described how his mother in 
Eritrea, who had never wanted him to leave in the first place, has since had to sell all her 
property and jewellery to pay kidnappers for his release when he was captured in eastern 
Sudan: “Now, they are waiting for me to help them at least by paying the house rent so that 
they can move to a good house. They are living in slums now.”159 With his family living in 
the slums in Asmara, the pressure to reach Europe has never been greater.  
Responsibility-sharing and refugee policies 
There is insufficient recognition of the key role played by migration and refugee policy in 
the HoA – both in Europe and in countries within the region. The Khartoum Process 
appears to give insufficient weight to the role that the EU’s strict migration policies, and 
the scarcity of legal migration routes, play in encouraging irregular migration. Instead, 
“mixed migration, and trafficking and smuggling of vulnerable persons, are portrayed as 
regional, African issues, rather than a joint, international problem.”160 Importantly, and 
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in contrast to the Rabat Process,161 while “safe and voluntary passage” was raised in the 
Joint Valetta Action Plan, this emphasis was not operationalised in the Khartoum Process.  
The lack of serious engagement with legal routes reflects a broader context in which 
migrant and refugee “off-shoring” – whereby states pay another state to host asylum 
seekers or refugees – is gaining traction globally. Australia, which can perhaps take the 
dubious credit for having piloted this idea for the past two decades, has enacted a series 
of measures to keep asylum seekers off their territory, for instance through a deal with 
Papua New Guinea and Nauru. More recently, the EU made a deal with Turkey in 2016 in 
an attempt to reduce the number of, primarily Syrian, asylum seekers making the 
dangerous journey across the Mediterranean. The EU agreed to take one Syrian refugee for 
resettlement in exchange for every “irregular” migrant returned from Greece into Turkey. 
Meanwhile, the deal has mainly resulted in thousands of asylum seekers stranded in dire 
conditions in Greece.162 
The lack of serious engagement with legal routes reflects a 
broader context in which migrant and refugee “off-shoring” – 
whereby states pay another state to host asylum seekers or 
refugees – is gaining traction globally 
While this approach may be politically expedient, it is deeply problematic as it exposes the 
reality behind the idea of “responsibility sharing” that is supposed to lie at the heart of 
responses to large-scale forced migration crises. It also obscures reality: contrary to public 
perceptions in Europe, by far the greatest number of displaced people are currently in the 
Middle East, Asia and Africa, meaning that low-income and/or fragile states continue to 
bear the greatest responsibility. The Kenyan government’s announcement in May 2016 to 
close Dadaab refugee camp, home to over 300,000 Somalis, was no coincidence in this 
regard.163 Likewise the “Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework” (CRRF), which was 
outlined in the New York Declaration, and intended to form the basis for a Global 
Compact on refugees, due to be adopted by member states in 2018, has so far failed to 
deliver in Uganda, where the response to a huge refugee crisis continues to be woefully 
under-funded. The EU’s approach, therefore, insufficiently recognises the fact that it is 
untenable for the burden of asylum to be met by a few states (and often ones that lack 
 
161. The Rabat Process, or The Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development, is a consultation framework bringing 
together European and primarily West African countries, the European Commission (EC), and the Commission of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). See Rabat Process, “The Rabat Process An original and operational 
Dialogue on migration and development issues.” www.rabat-process.org/images/RabatProcess/publications/Rabat-Process-
Migration-Dialogue_brochure-2017-web_EN.pdf Accessed 23 October 2017.  
162. Amnesty International, “Greece: Asylum seekers in abysmal conditions on islands.” 23 October 2017. 
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/10/greece-asylum-seekers-in-abysmal-conditions-on-islands/ Accessed 23 October 
2017. 
163. See, for instance, Lucy Hovil, “Why is the cost of hosting refugees falling on the world's poorest states?” The Guardian, 13 
May 2016. www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/may/13/why-is-the-cost-of-hosting-refugees-falling-on-poorest-
states-kenya-dadaab-closing Accessed 13 July 2017.  
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resources), with financial support coming in at the discretion of third states. This fosters 
asymmetrical relationships of dependence and ignores the principle of shared 
international responsibility for refugees, embodied in the Preamble of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. 
The EU’s approach, therefore, insufficiently recognises the fact 
that it is untenable for the burden of asylum to be met by a few 
states (and often ones that lack resources), with financial support 
coming in at the discretion of third states. 
As a result, there is limited scope to engage with deficient and flawed migration and 
refugee policies within the HoA region. Many of those who move from the region to 
Europe do so as a result of failures in policies in the first countries to which they move. 
There is a particular gap in refugee policies, which have left millions of people living for 
years and sometimes decades in a protracted situation of exile with no prospect of real 
integration. These failures hinge primarily on the emphasis on encampment for those in 
exile and failures around durable solutions which, combined, have created a semi-
permanent state of emergency, jeopardising quality of life and bringing the 
humanitarian system to the breaking point.164  
In Ethiopia, for instance, although a few Eritreans are officially allowed to live out of the 
camps under the country’s Out of Camps Policy (initiated in 2015 as a pilot scheme for 
UNHCR’s Alternatives to Camps policy), in practice most have tight restrictions on their 
freedom of movement. At the same time, the Sudan government insists that Eritrean 
refugees live in camps, albeit a policy that is widely defied, with many Eritreans living in 
Khartoum despite the fact that it puts them at risk of arbitrary arrest and refoulement. In 
a context in which repatriation is generally viewed as the only durable solution, and 
where protracted political crises (in the case of Eritrea) or conflicts (in the case of Sudan, 
Somalia and South Sudan) make this impossible, the ability for people to find access to 
both safety and livelihoods is extremely limited. In this environment, local integration 
could not be further off the political radar.  
Those who are moving around the region are interacting with these realities all the time, 
and are making decisions within the parameters of these policy restrictions. Thus, when 
asked how far they planned their journey when they first left their homes, some of those 
interviewed said that their intention from the beginning was to reach Europe or the US, 
and they had planned accordingly. Many others, however, said that their only definite 
plan was to leave Eritrea and find somewhere to live where they could be safe and find 
work. While not denying the strong aspirations that many have with regards to where 
 
164. For an extensive critique of the encampment of refugees, as well as failures around durable solutions, see Hovil 2016, pp. 
155 – 191. 
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they could one day live, for most the priority was to find a place where they felt they could 
have a future.  
Encampment  
Interviewees talked about the many problems associated with encampment. In Sudan, 
and to a lesser extent Ethiopia, many had opted either never to go into the camps in the 
first place or to move out of the camps despite the prohibition on doing so. In practice, 
this meant that those who left the camps were technically “illegal” and no longer received 
any humanitarian assistance.  
In Sudan, it is only possible to register as a refugee, and then receive assistance, in the 
camps. As a young man said, “I am registered with UNHCR, but they won’t help me with 
anything because I don’t stay in the camp.”165 However, interviewees were unequivocal in 
their condemnation of the physical and security conditions in these camps. As one 
woman said, “Shagarab camp is like Adi Abeyto prison in Eritrea. How can you stay in a 
camp regulated by traffickers? In Eritrea, there are arrests and detentions in Adi Abeyto. 
Similarly, there are continuous kidnapping incidences in Shagarab… It should not be 
described as a refugee camp. It is just a smugglers’ camp where the security forces sell 
refugees to the Rashaida.”166  
“In Shagarab… It should not be described as a refugee camp. 
 It is just a smugglers’ camp where the security forces sell refugees 
to the Rashaida” 
Indeed, during the field research in eastern Sudan there was an incident in which 18 
Eritrean refugees were kidnapped from wed-Sherifoy refugee camp by an unknown 
armed gang, suspected of being linked to the Rashaida.167 Another man, who was living 
in Kassala town and is now looking for work, explained why he left the camps: “In 
Shagarab camp they gave us nothing, no help, no work, and sometimes no safety. So, I 
didn’t want to spend my life in the camp especially when I knew that there are Eritrean 
people living there who have been there for more than 10 years.”168 A man living in 
Shagarab refugee camp talked of the dangers they face from Eritrean officials entering 
the camp: “It’s easy for Eritrean security members to enter [the camp] pretending to be 
refugees and taking people away.”169 
In Ethiopia, there was general consensus that the camps were not as bad as in Sudan. For 
instance, a woman living in Addis Ababa who had been kidnapped out of Shagarab 
 
165. Interview with Eritrean man, Khartoum, Sudan, May 2017. Left Eritrea in 2017. 
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167. Field notes, Kassala, Sudan, 4 July 2017.  
168. Interview with Eritrean man, Kassala, Sudan, July 2017. Left Eritrea in 2016. 
169. Interview with Eritrean man, Shagarab refugee camp, October 2017. Left Eritrea in 2013. 
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refugee camp said, “The camps [in Ethiopia] are at least safe, but the conditions are 
terrible.”170 Another woman described the Ethiopian camps in this way: “The condition in 
the camp is hard to bear. Though we were treated well, there isn’t enough food, health care 
or other facilities.” As she went on to say, “UNHCR were very helpful in facilitating the 
transfer of my case to Addis Ababa in order to join my ex-husband as an urban refugee.” 
171 Some talked of how they had hoped to get into the system for resettlement by going to 
the camps, but once they had realised that would not happen they had left. 
Access to work 
As a result of their dubious legal status outside of the camps (despite the fact that, under 
international refugee law, refugee status should not be predicated on living in a camp), 
access to livelihoods was a huge struggle for most of the people interviewed. In Ethiopia, 
many of those interviewed did have some form of work, but they were unable to support 
themselves with their income. Many rely on family members in the diaspora to subsidise 
their living expenses (often the same people who paid for the smugglers to get them out 
of Eritrea), but some do not: “I do not have a permanent job and regular source of income. 
I do not have anyone who can support me from the diaspora.”172 “As I am a refugee I do 
not have a work permit. Hence, I cannot support myself. This is a challenge for me because 
this is the first time I have to ask for help from any one.”173 
On the other hand, others living in Addis Ababa talked of how they had managed to find 
work and were self-sufficient: “At first I used to stay with my friends. But after few months 
I got a job and was able to support myself working in a garage.”174 Others had recently 
arrived and were hopeful they would find work: “Of course, I would like to go to England, 
but I know it is hard, dangerous. If I can, I will stay in Ethiopia and try to change my life 
through work.”175 One young man said that he had moved out of the camp because “the 
Ethiopian government allowed some Eritrean refugees to continue their education in 
universities. According to this programme, I participated in the national exam and joined 
Addis Ababa University in 2011.”176 He said he had no plans to move on. 
In Khartoum, however, people talked about the challenges they faced in accessing work, 
often related to the discrimination. As one man said, “Here in Khartoum I face so many 
challenges, such as discrimination in my work place. One day after I had done my tasks 
the employer refused to give me my salary. As my status is illegal I can do nothing against 
him.”177 Or as a woman, who herself was employed, said, “I'm lucky because I working in a 
private place. But I know many Eritreans who face all kinds of repression, blackmail and 
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discrimination.”178 These challenges in accessing work, and in particularly the 
discrimination associated with that, has to be understood in a broader context in which 
many Sudanese, especially those who do not fit within a tightly defined definition of 
Sudanese identity as defined by the state, are also discriminated against and encounter 
serious problems in accessing work in Khartoum.179  
Safety and documentation 
Linked to the challenges in accessing work, was the fact that many of those interviewed 
who were living in Sudan talked about fears for their personal safety – and particularly 
their inability to move around freely. One man had hoped to stay in Sudan and find work: 
“I had first planned to go to Sudan and stay, but I had so many of the same problems there 
as I had in Eritrea. The police started to round us up there too – although it’s not as severe 
as in Eritrea. So I had to change my mind and keep going on my journey.”180 There were 
multiple stories of people being arrested by the police and only released after they paid a 
bribe: “As I have no ID, I got arrested by police, and released after I paid money to them.”181  
Another interviewee talked of how the hardships in Khartoum had led him to keep 
moving towards Europe: “The roundups on the street and an inability to work safely made 
things worse for me. Initially, I tried to work and help my family at least for a few years 
and then I could get enough time to decide. But, I could not even help myself there... Also, 
it is not safe in Sudan. I did not call my family from Sudan because I did not want them to 
be worried about me.”182 So he decided to leave for Libya and finally reached Europe.  
“it is not safe in Sudan” 
Furthermore, several of those interviewed talked of their fear of being deported back to 
Eritrea: “I have been arrested by Sudanese police because my ID card had expired. I also 
heard many stories of arrests and deportation of Eritrean refugees. Normally refugees pay 
money to the police to buy their freedom when they get arrested. I did the same when I 
got arrested. I paid a bribe to the policeman and he released me. We have no choice. If the 
police arrest me and deport me back home the Eritrean government will treat me badly. 
Because of that, I have stopped working in public places such as restaurants and cafes. I 
keep working privately as a babysitter at homes.”183 A man living in Addis Ababa said that 
he came to Ethiopia because “Eritrean migrants are forcefully returned to Eritrea from 
other neighbouring countries and I didn’t want to be a victim.”184 
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Therefore, as one woman living in Khartoum summarised: “When your status is a refugee 
without protection in another country, you will face many challenges, such as risks of 
arrest, deportation and unemployment. I have been arrested myself, and I know of many 
other Eritreans who were subjected to arrests and deportation.”185 Refugees who do not 
find protection in the first country they arrive are likely to move on.  
Importantly, under international law, refugees are not required to remain in a country 
that does not provide effective protection, including where reception conditions fall 
short of the rights set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention.186 European destination 
countries must therefore not deny recognition where the person concerned entered a 
neighbouring country, and other transit countries, but these places did not offer effective 
protection.  
No return, but what’s the alternative?  
Once more, the issue comes back to whether or not people have alternatives. 
Unequivocally, people believe it is not safe to go home: “I can’t go home, especially in the 
current situation in Eritrea. I will be arrested and punished because I travelled illegally. 
Either they send you to jail or to military training camps out of city while denying you 
family visits.”187 One woman told of how she had tried to leave Eritrea once before, but 
had been caught: “They sent me to the prison for eight months. It was terrible. When they 
arrest illegal travellers, they send them straight to prison, but there is no specific term or 
period of prison. It’s different from case to case. And if you hadn’t finished military service 
they will send you back for training. The training is one year and the service is life-
long.”188 As another young man said, “I have considered turning back so many times. But 
there is no way I can. If I go back I don’t know what will happen to me. I don’t know if I 
will be imprisoned or tortured or sent back to the army to serve indefinitely.”189 
So what, realistically, is the alternative for people? In a context in which millions of people 
have lived in protracted exile, some for decades, with no “durable solutions” in sight, it is 
hard for people to have hope. As one woman said, “When I left Eritrea I was intent on 
reaching Europe. But after I experienced the difficulties of the smuggling trip [from her 
home in Eritrea to Khartoum], I hated smuggling. On the other hand, I'm not happy in 
Sudan, and I can't return home. Moreover, I have no passport and no option of legal travel 
from Sudan. I live in this complicated situation.”190  
For many of those interviewed, therefore, moving onwards in their journey was very 
much a last resort. As stated above, legal routes out of Eritrea are very difficult, especially 
for young people. As one woman said, “It's not easy for youth to travel out of Eritrea. In 
 
185. Interview with Eritrean woman, Khartoum, Sudan, May 2017. Left Eritrea in 2014.  
186. UNHCR, Summary Conclusions on the Concept of “Effective Protection” in the Context of Secondary Movements of Refugees 
and Asylum-Seekers, Lisbon Expert Roundtable, 9-10 December 2012, February 2003. 
187. Interview with Eritrean woman, Khartoum, Sudan, May 2017. Left Eritrea in 2014. 
188. Interview with Eritrean woman, Khartoum, Sudan, May 2017. Left Eritrea in 2016. 
189. Interview with Eritrean woman, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 2017. Left Eritrea in 2016. 
190. Interview with Eritrean woman, Khartoum, Sudan, June 2017. Left Eritrea in 2015. 
TACKLING THE ROOT CAUSES OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SMUGGLING FROM ERITREA 
 
 
48 TESTING POLICY ASSUMPTIONS IN LIGHT OF EMPIRICAL REALITIES 
 
fact, if you’re under 40 years of age it’s prohibited. The government also imposes tough 
requirements for travel and unless you meet these requirements you can't travel 
anywhere. You need to have finished your national service, be sick or married to someone 
living abroad in order to get clearance for travel.”191 As another woman asked, “Can you 
believe me if I tell you that I have no passport? Not only me, but all of the Eritrean youth. 
My younger brother got admission to university in the US, but the government authorities 
would not issue him with a passport. What can we do if we stay in Eritrea? There is no good 
education, no fair payment if you're a worker. The salary they give you cannot even feed 
you.”192  
With tight restrictions on legal routes out of Eritrea, many had left the country in the hope 
that they could carve out a future for themselves elsewhere. Many, of course, hoped that 
they might find a legal route into Europe or the US. One young woman told of how her 
sister encouraged her to come to Khartoum because she had applied on her behalf 
through the diversity visa lottery193 to migrate to the US.194 An Eritrean refugee living in 
Addis Ababa told of how he had tried to go to Europe legally by applying for a visa to study, 
but he had been turned down. “I have no other way to get there legally, so this [entering 
illegally] is the only way for me now.”195 Others have remained in Sudan or Ethiopia, and 
yet continue to live with huge challenges – challenges that might, in time, push them to 
continue a perilous journey.  
Indeed, the lack of legal routes to Europe despite the considerable burden of asylum that 
is being met by states in the region, is recognised by migrants and governments alike. 
From the perspective of governments in the HoA, therefore, while many are happy to 
leverage the humanitarian and development assistance attached to current migration 
policy initiatives, many have a fundamentally different set of priorities to European 
states in relation to the policies that underlie this money. Not only do states that are 
hosting huge numbers of refugees want to see a global asylum system based on burden-
sharing, they also want to see legal and fair routes for their citizens to seek employment 
elsewhere. In the case of the latter, remittances that are sent home by migrant workers are 
often crucial components to a country's economy. For instance, the Ethiopian 
government has deliberately made sure that its citizens have easy access to passports, and 
even offers assistance and guidance to migrants who are heading for the Gulf States and 
Middle East.196 The Eritrean government is somewhat more ambiguous in this regard: it 
benefits from the remittances sent into the country through a system of taxation, and yet 
tries to prevent people from leaving the country in the first place.  
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Conclusion 
There are multiple challenges inherent within the approach currently informing the 
operations of the Khartoum Process. To date efforts have neither dented the numbers 
reaching Europe, nor stopped abuses. In fact, in the case of the latter the findings suggest 
the opposite: as barriers are created without sufficient alternatives being offered, people 
are taking greater and greater risks and journeys are becoming increasingly dangerous – 
and expensive. The only people benefitting from this are the smugglers and traffickers.  
EU policy makers are not blind to these challenges. But what is the alternative? As stated 
at the outset, the findings point to the fact that a shift in focus needs to take place 
primarily onto the political context in which migration takes place rather than the 
criminality that it attracts. This shift acknowledges the lack of choices that people are 
confronted with throughout their journeys, a lack of choice that is driven by structural 
factors that cannot be resolved without a deeply political engagement that begins to 
dismantle them.  
as barriers are created without sufficient alternatives being 
offered, people are taking greater and greater risks and journeys 
are becoming increasingly dangerous – and expensive 
Instead, an approach is needed that recognises unequivocally the reality of life in Eritrea; 
that any approach that has its primary focus on the criminality that migration attracts is 
likely to be palliative at best and harmful at worst, because it deals exclusively with a 
symptom rather than the cause; that recognises and is built on a robust understanding of 
the broader context of forced migration in the HoA region; that recognises that 
insufficient legal routes for migration have left people devoid of hope for their futures; 
and that shows greater awareness of the need to accompany initiatives to increase access 
to livelihoods with a wider political conversation in which spaces for legal and political 
belonging are negotiated and expanded.  
Therefore, the findings suggest that a top-down, instrumentalist approach to “migration 
management” creates not only the reputational risks acknowledged by the EU.197 It is also 
unlikely to be effective in a context where people are desperate, and determined to escape 
oppressive political systems, conflict and dismal living conditions. Perhaps more 
importantly, it creates a serious risk of unintentionally increasing the likelihood of 
human rights abuses for those on the move, rather than bringing them to an end. An 
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alternative approach that heeds empirical findings, and would hence be better suited to 
effectively address mixed migration, needs to be:  
 People centric: reflecting the experiences of the individuals and communities 
concerned, and enabling them to participate in the policy-making processes; 
 Contextual: understanding mixed migration as a complex reality and focusing on how 
best to address the root causes and multiple factors contributing to such reality. Such 
an approach demands a broader, mid- to long-term engagement beyond specific 
projects;  
 Rights-based: developing a holistic approach that views protection of human rights 
(also with a view to preventing forced displacement/migration) and the protection of 
the rights of refugees and migrants as fundamental and integral to any policy on 
mixed migration. This is both in terms of whom any engagement is meant to benefit 
and of addressing its root causes;  
 Based on mutuality and shared responsibility: acknowledging mixed migration as an 
issue of shared interest and concern; fostering mobility and sharing responsibility 
with a view to providing durable solution for those in need of protection. 
The Khartoum Process created a platform to deal with one of the most pressing issues 
faced by countries in the Horn of Africa, but if steered in the wrong direction, this 
platform may end up doing more harm than good.  
the issue of alternatives lies at the heart of what would constitute 
good policy-making in this environment 
Ultimately, it is clear that the issue of alternatives lies at the heart of what would 
constitute good policy-making in this environment. And a key component to this is an 
emphasis on protection of those on the move rather than on restricting movement. If the 
primary goal of migration management becomes one of protection for people who are 
moving rather than trying to restrict their onward movement, there is no indicator that 
the numbers of people arriving in Europe would increase. In fact, the findings suggest the 
opposite: provide protection for people where they are – genuine, politically integrated 
protection – and the compulsion to take huge risks inevitably reduces. It is also an 
approach that protects the EU from subduing or even losing its moral compass in 
responding to the political pressure put upon them by electorates. And ultimately, it 
supports the notion that the most efficient way to tackle smuggling and trafficking is to 
take away the need for them.  
The need for an empirically 
grounded EU policy on mixed 
migration in the Horn of Africa
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